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The Sino-Soviet dispute affected a fundamental realign-
ment of the world power structure. It has been suggested
that improving Sino-Soviet relations presaae yet another
such change. This will not be the case. T>>e USSR is hy any
measure the more powerful and decisive actor in the dispute.
It considers the existence of the dispute and the nositi ?r.
of the PRC an affront to its dignity and a threat to its
interests. The dispute should he resolved but only on
Soviet terms. Compromise would risk ideological and strate-
gic stability. At the same time PRC leaders face analogous
constraints that prevent compromise on their part. T^e
Soviets' only other solution, military force, can only be
applied at greater risk than compromise would entail. • Con-
tinuing the relationship on terms of peaceful coexistence,
while operating diplomatically and internationally to
contain the PRC, is the only alternative left.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The history of Sino-Soviet relations is over 700 years
long. It may be said to begin with the Mongol invasion of
Russia in the thirteenth century. Eventually, the Russian
Empire reversed the situation and began to encroach on
Chinese territory. By the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, Czarist influence was very strong in the decayinc
Chinese Empire. Then came the Russian Revolution of 1917.
It was a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations.
The international ideology of the new Soviet state
presented the Chinese with two important changes in Soviet
foreign policy— the change regarding nationalistic forces
and the policy of world revolution. The internal disarray
in Russia caused by the revolution, of course, eased Russian
pressure and influence on China. Yet, the Chinese were
astounded when the new Soviet regime announced it was repu-
diating the "unequal treaties" the czars and bourgeoisie had
forced, on China. It was, however, in conformity with com-
munist propaganda which had denounced capitalist imperialism
and promoted ethnic nationalism. Even though the Soviets
never followed through with their pledge, it was important
in principle. The Soviet communists' belief in world revo-
lution similarly fostered good relations with the
Nationalist regime in China. The Soviets decided to
support the Chinese revolution by ordering the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to join forces with the Chinese
Nationalists. This particular policy was ravaged by Chiang
Kai-shek in 1927, but the USSR continued to support,
covertly and via the COMINTERN, the CCP in its ultimately
successful revolution.
With the proclamation of the People's Republic o f China
in 1949, a potentially fruitful new era of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions should have ensued. There were indeed a few ye^rs
friendly and coocerative relations. But by the late l a S^'s
frictions began to develop. By the early 1960's, this
evolved into an open dispute marked by bitter polemics and a
cessation of trade. This continued until 1969, when actual
conflict along their mutual border broke out and both
nations uttered war threats. Subsequently tensions eased.,
but neither side has allowed their relations to be normal-
ized. Unresolved conflicts in ideology, national sovereian-
ty, territorial claims, defense postures, international
politics, and their respective national interests lie at the
root of their disagreement.
Even barring settlement of their most difficult problems
it would obviously be in the interests of both countries to
at least normalize their relations. Attempts to negotiate
peaceful settlements could then begin. This has not
happened.
In the 'fifteen years since the 1969 border clashes Sine-
Soviet relations have remained at a superficial level. This
includes minor trade agreements, low levels of cultural
exchange, technical discussions to formalize navigation on
their border river boundaries and a continuing series of
negotiations to resolve their border problems. The latter
border talk negotiations have the most potential for normal-
ization of relations. They are generally conducted at a
high level—deputy foreign minister— and have cnnti'i. i ' 1
despite interruptions.
It is difficult to judge the true state of Sino-Soviet
relations due to the nature of their closed societies. But
all the evidence suggests that so far there has been no pro-
gress in improving relations. There have been occasional
thaws in their mutual hostility, such as after Khrushchev
was ousted from Soviet leadership in 1964, after Mao
Zedong's death in 1^76 and after Deng Xiaoping established
himself in control about 1978. Conversely, mutual hostility
has always returned, and sometimes is exacerbated anew, as
after Hua Guofeng consolidated his power in late 1976, the





Currently Sino-Soviet relations are again in a 'thaw'.
There is some speculation that this time a viable detente
between the two countries is in the offing (although some of
the same speculation occurred during each prior 'thaw' !).
The difference this time is that even in the midst of two
peaks of hostility— Afghanistan and Vietnam/Kampuchea--hoth
sides have made some conciliatory overtures to the other.
Additionally, China's developing relations with apan and the
United States addes a new dimension to the international
situation. Finally, the recent leadership succession in the
USSR ^ay bring new opportunities for a breakthrough, ^-'iv.n'r
this is unlikely under Chernenko it may prove true cor his
s u c c e s s o r .
The focus of this paper is the Soviet perspective N "
current Sino-Soviet relations. The political asoects o f
their relations will be emphasized, but this necessarily
entails some discussion of historical, cultural, economic
and military matters. Such factors influence politics even
in countries governed by scientific socialism. Basically,
the following points will be addressed.
To place the dispute in the proper historical perspec-
tive, a review of Russo-Chinese and Sino-Soviet relations
reveals a history of tension between the two nations over
territorial matters. In this context, the modern Sino-
Soviet dispute is only a continuation of unresolved expan-
sionist pressure. Of course, this is only a small part of a
very complex issue. For the two biggest socialist states in
the world to turn against each other was an astounding event
--so much so that many Western observers long doubted its
veracity, or deemed it would be of short duration. It was
10
simply not in either country's national interest to let the
dispute exist, or at least, persist. The reason for this
lack of comprehension was the failure of observers from
pluralistic Western societies to credit the importance of
ideology in single ideology societies. It is the basic com-
ponent of political thought, and heavily influences polit-
ical action in both the USSR and PRC. Ideology is also
necessarily subject to interpretation. The leaders who for-
mulate it do so in the context of their own experience und
national environment. It was quite natural for the newlv
independent PRC to still have much in common, and support,
its ally and precursor in the socialist community. As the
CCP gained experience and confidence in recognizing the
special needs of its own country it was also natural for its
practical application of the ideology to diverge from that
of the CPSU. Eventually the difference became irreconcil-
able. The strong belief in their respective formulations of
the communist ideology, modified in their national interest,
drove them apart. It is important to realize that the
leaders of the USSR and PRC are as fallible as anyone else.
Their ideals are subject to their personalities an-" emo-
tions . Personal disputes between their leaders and
emotional ties to national prestige (as in territorial
boundaries) also adversely affected Sino-Soviet relations.
A dispute cannot really be settled until its root causes
have been dealt with. It can be postponed, or ignored, or
11
even forgotten, while it lies dormant. 3ut it still exists
intact until its causes have been removed. Often the rcce
(or belief"1 is that in the passaae of time events will alter
so a dispute can be solved without direct action: it will
become meaningless or trivial. The Sino-Soviet dispute is
in a dormant stage. In the absence of overt hostilities,
with successive leadership changes and renewed cultural an"
economic activity between the USSR and PRC many observers
predict a future detente in their relations. Contra riwis >,
others point to their apparently increasingly =mtaaoni ^ t ic
national policy goals and predict hostilities will brea':
out
.
The conclusion of this paper is that neither course is
as likely as a slightly improved form of the current status
quo. Substantial elements of the original causes of the
dispute still act to prevent a complete rapproachment . Each
side is confident of the propriety of its position and will
only minimally bend. Even so, there is mutual recognition
that armed conflict would be worse. The high force levels
each employs along their border arise more from latent
caution than intent to impose a solution. They recognize
their respective conviction of purpose ami do not of fer
the temptation of unprepared military forces
.
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II . HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SIMO-SOVIET RELATIONS
A. RUSSO-CHINESE HISTORY PRIOR TO 1917
The Russian nation consisted of the expanding city-state
of Kiev when it was conquered in 1237-38 by the Mongol Batu
Khan. Asian influence on the Russians was strong for the
next two centuries, but the sharp cultural difference
between the nomadic Mongols and the settled Slavs mitiaated
the impact of Mongol rule- There was little interna r ria^o
,
and the Mongols did not interfere with the Russian's Greek
Orthodox religion. After the initial conquest, the most
onerous obligation was the yearly tribute paid to the
Mongols. The Mongols simply "had no notion of what could be
done with a., .city, nor how they might use it for the
consolidation and expansion of their power. "^
By the latter half of the fifteenth century, various
Russian princedoms had grown strong enough to operate with
almost independent policies. The city of Novgorod had
established a commercial empire that was the Russians'
primary link with Asia, and the princes of Moscow had estab-
lished complete control of their environs.
Ivan III, Prince of Moscow, began the process of the
city-state's expansion which would continue for the next
four centuries. In 1471, he conquered Novgorod ' s commercial
empire, and in 1480 he severed the last remnant of Monool
13
rule by refusing to pay tribute. For the next two hundred
years, successive czars acquired (without any serious set-
backs) the Khanats of Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia and outposts
in Tomsk, Yakutsk and Okhotsk. But in the late 1600 's, con-
flict developed with the Manchu Empire in the Amur /Ussuri
river region. The Manchus successfully drove the Russians
back and formalized the settlement with the Treaty ^~
Nerchinsk in 1689.
It was not until the Opium Wars between Bribair an.-]
China in the 1940's displayed 'China's weakness that -ussia
was able to make significant inroads into Chinese territory.
The Treaties of Nanking (1842), Aiaun (1858), Peking (1«6CM,
Hi (1881), Anglo-Russian (1895), Russo-Chinese (1896^ an-41
Tsitihar (1911), to name the most important, formalized the
de facto Russian occupation of Chinese territory alona the
entire border (and Mongolia).- These treaties established
the border basically as it is now. Russia had, and would
certainly have more (formerly) Chinese territory today were
it not for the intervention by the other great powers (which
were apprehensive of further Russian gains) and Russia's
loss to Japan in 1904. ^ These setbacks cost Russia
hundreds of thousands of square miles o^ territory in
Manchuria and to the South-West of Monaolia.
14
B. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1^17-1949
The Russian Revolution in 1917 marked an abrubt turn-
about in Sino-Soviet relations. Two tenets of the Bolshevik
ideoloay particularly affected Soviet policy towards strife-
torn China. Lenin's view was that in the long run ethnic
nationalities would inevitably be superceded by the com-
munist inspired 'Soviet Man' . Therefore, nolicies were
promoted by the Party that garnered minority nationality
support, e.c., official recocnition, and even inde^pa. lQ r/:e
'for various nationalities. The second point is that Soviet
leaders believed their bran;"1 of Marxism, Leninism was truly
international in scope and would eventually be adopted
throughout the world. Regional differences would disappear
as fraternal brotherhood expanded.
On the basis of these points, the Soviet reaime issued
the Karakhan Manifesto in 1920 renouncing the Chinese terri-
torial acquisitions of its predecessor. It would, after
all, not matter in the long run, and it was a gesture of
goodwill that promoted the Communist cause in China. Tt is
interesting to note that although the USSR never repudiated
the Karakhan Manifesto, it did nothing more than stall
during subsequent negotiations! At the same time the
Comintern, under Lenin's guidance, decided to support the
national liberation movement in China. As decided by the
Fourth COMINTERN Congress, policy would be, in the' short
run, to support the bourgeoisie, and in the lona run, the
15
pes an try. To this end in 1°23, the Chinese Communist Darty
(CCP) was ordered to support the pro-parliamentary Chinese
Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang (KMT). The Sun-Jo^fe
Declaration in 1923 formalized Soviet support for the KM^.
Chiang Kai-shek's successful and bloody purge of the
communists in 1927 decimated the CCP. This was a severe
blow to the Soviet policy of cooperation with the KMT. ;-at
the Communist Party an- 1 official Soviet reaction would be
was not easy for the Soviet lominated Cn *1 IMTHP^ t- i ec j _ - -
spite of the CCP's disaster. Communist-KMT col l.abora ^ io-
was, after all, a policy initiated by the COMINTERN under
Lenin's Guidance. Support of moderate (KMT) revolutionary
elements was consonant with the interests of both the Soviet
state and a long range view of Marxist ideoloay. Moreover,
Stalin had earlier rejected Trotsky's radical position of
intransigent world revolution in favor of 'socialism in one
country' . In this Stalin had allied himself with the
rightest group— Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov. Chiano's purge
presented Stalin with a dilemma. Either capitulate to
members of the Trotskyite opposition or maintain alleqiance
to the discredited (because of the purge) 'rightest' group.
Stalin compromised. Borodin and Bukharin were blamed for
the disaster, the CCP was ordered to follow an openly
revolutionary social policy, and official relations with the
KMT .were to- continue. Covert support to the CCP was in the
form of limited funds and advisers. By .1929 Soviet and KMT
16
friction in Manchuria reached the point of armed clashes.
Stalin broke diplomatic relations with the KMT over this.
In 1932 the Japanese invasion of Manchuria induced Stalin to
reconsider, relations were restored with the KMT to estab-
lish a common cause against the Japanese. By 1934, Stalin
found it useful to revert to the earlier policy of complete
cooperation with the KMT as part of the war against Japan.
This policy continued through 1944.
The period 1 945-1949 was chiefly notable for the victory
of the Chinese Communists. Their victory was immediately
recognized for the momentous event it was. Tie surprising
feature was that as late as January, 1947, Stalin was still
negotiating with Chiang and providing little help to the
CCP. Perhaps, as Adam. Ulam says, "The Soviets, encrosse- 1 in
the enormous problems of socialist construction in their own
country, could be excused for not realizing the enormous
revolutionary potentialities in [China]. "^ In any event,
Stalin had continued the policy of a united, front (CCP and
KMT) against Japan through the end of the war. In accord-
ance with the Yalta agreement, he signed the Soviet-Republic
of China Treaty of Alliance in 1945, thereby gainina Outer
Mongolia and Port Arthur, the use of Port Dairen and part
ownership of the Manchuria Railway. However, the treaty
also provided that the Soviets would only deal with the
official government, and that Soviet troops would quickly
withdraw from Manchuria after the war. On the whole, Stalin
17
kept to the treaty. The significant discrepancy was that
while Soviet troops still occupied ''anchuria, CCP troops
were allowed in and outfitter] with captured Japanese
weapons. This provided the CCP with a power base from
which they were able to eventually conquer Chiang. But it
was not until the May-June, 1947 CCP victories that an
inkling of Chiang's weakness became apparent to most ov se-~-
vers, and late 1943 before the ultimate victory of the CCP
was obvious. Only at this point did the c^"iets be" in.
publicly side with the CCP. The lack of Soviet support .-/as
a sore point the CCP was not soon to foraet.
C. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1949-1956
Immediately after Mao Zedong proclaimed, the People's
Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, the USSR with-
drew recognition of the KMT and recognized the PRC. This
would seem to have augured well for Sino-Soviet relations.
So also did the terms of the (February, 1950) Sino-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship. The terms inclu^erl large amounts of
military and economic aid to China and expanded cultural
exchanges to involve thousands of students. What was not so
promising was the arbitrary two-month delay Stalin made Mao
wait in Moscow before the treaty negotiations began. Then,
in June, 1950, the Korean War beaan. After the Chinese were
draaged into the fighting Mao chaffed at beina left to do,
as he considered, the Soviet's fighting. But Stalin's death
18
in 1953 removed a damper from the festering disagreements
that his prestige and prominence had hitherto mitinated.
.
These included Soviet presumption of ideologic authority and
Stalinist initiatives to construct pro-Soviet economic
programs and political factions within China.
0. THE SIMO-SOVIET DISPUTE 1956-1969
The period 1956-1969 marks the transition of modern
Sino-Scviet relations from a position of general coopera-
tion, though with private disagreements, to one of open an -]
bitter conflict. 1956 is a distinctly subjective choicp tc
begin this era. Much of the information available about the
early years of the dispute was only provided in the later
years of the dispute by the public charges an^
countercharges each side made.
The significance of 1956 is that it marks the 2Ptr
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress.
Khrushchev used this Congress to announce the de-Stal iniza-
tion, peaceful coexistence' and disarmament policies that
shook the world communist movements . The PRC took particu-
lar exception to these policies. Peking charged Moscow with
abandoning both the world communist movement and Pekincr.
Over the next four years, the USSR and PRC fourr 5 them-
selves on opposite sides of an increasing number of issues.
Mao's 'Let a hundred flowers bloom'' policy (1957) was
distasteful to Soviet leaders more accustomed to repress
19
non-official views than encouraae then.. The year 1^5P was
critical for Sino-Soviet relations. Mao re p use^ to allow
Soviet military bases on Chinese territory, risked nuclear
war with the US by attacking the Nationalist Chinese islands
of Quemoy and Matsu and stated that the losses incurred by a
nuclear war would be acceptable (all w^ile under the
Soviet's nuclear umbrella). The CCP issued its first direct
challenoe to the CPSU by claiming the imminent achievement
of communism, via the "peoples' communes" program. This ,>/=>s
regarded' by the CPSU as a sliaht, implyina that Soviet
policy was not progressive. In conjunction witr the
peoples' communes was the PRC ' s "Great Leap Forward".
Industry and agriculture were reorganized around individual
communes. This economic de-centralization was carried to
dramatic lengths, "every rural subgroup would create its own
small blast furnaces for the production of iron..."-' The
Soviets were stunned and perturbed by the Chinese persis-
tence— two years--with such a disastrous policy. Consider-
ing the above— from Soviet eyes—Chinese irresponsibility,
it is not surprising to witness Soviet refusal to provide
China with a prototype atomic bomb despite a prior arranae-
ment to do so. Soviet misgivings with their Chinese allies
were amply displayed when they remained neutral durino the
Chinese-Indian border clashes of 1959. Khrushchev claimed
the first public airing of the dispute was conducted in 1960
by the PRC ' s Albanian proteges. The Soviets were outraoed
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by Albania's defection to the PPC, and retaliated by
cancelling all economic and military aid to Albania.
From this point forward each nation not only indulged
itself with public accusations and criticisms of the other
but also shifted to tangible evidence of discontent. In
I960, economic relations were broken as the USSR suddenly
withdrew all its advisors from China and beaan to cut its
aid package to China. By the middle of the decade, trade
between the two countries reached its nadir. Cultural
exchange visits */ere curtailed by both sides. Tn 1962, the
USSR began to incite anti-Chinese ferment among Chinese
Moslems in the central Asian border regions. That same year
the PRC closed all Soviet consulates in China, and the USSR
publicly took a neutral stance during the Chinese-Indian war
of 1962. The latter particularly aggravated the Chinese
because not only did the USSR fail to publicly support them,
it covertly supplied India with planes to prosecute the war.
The USSR had long promoted better relations with India, but
this was also indicative of Soviet reservations about their
future prospects with China.
Nineteen Sixty-Three marked another escalation of the
Sino-Soviet conflict. In March of that year, the PRC
publicly announced it no longer accepted the validity of
nine "unequal treaties" of the nineteenth century by which
Chinese territory was ceded to various states . The
anti-Soviet content of this was unmistakable— the PRC
21
specifically named most of its past treaties with Russia.
This appellation neatly recalled the words of the Karakhan
Manifesto of 1920. Furthermore, reference was pointedly
made to the fact that this affected approximately 600,^0
square miles of Central Asia (Soviet territory"! . T^e
announcement demanded renegotiation of these treaties.
Later in the year, the first public statement of Sino-Soviet
border problems was made by the PRC. ,TVbe PRC charged Moscow
with conducting subversive activities in its nort'i-ves^n
province of Xinjiang. Both nations began to reinforce the!*"
border garrisons. Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 tempere 1 the
•dispute for a few months. But the increasing radicalism o p
the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966 carried a strong
anti-Soviet line that soon produced a return to the stand inn
of the dispute as of a year earlier. Border inoidents--
possibly numbering in the hundreds— continued and both
ambassadors were recalled and were not to return for five
years
.
E. THE 1969 BORDER CLASHES
The peak of Sino-Soviet tension occurred in 1 Q 6 Q . On
March 2, the PRC apparently instigated a serious border
clash on the Ussuri River at Damansky Island.^ Hundreds
of regular troops were involved, and armor, artillery, mor-
tars and heavy machine guns were employed. Fiahtina broke
out again two weeks later at Damansky, and then through the
22
rest of the summer and fall at various points along the bor-
der. The numbers of troops and weapons involved is quite
significant. These were not routine patrols bickering in
the snow. Evidently the authorities in both countries anti-
cipated just such an outbreak, or desired it. Equally
illuminating is that "rather than letting tempers cool, the
two Communist giants had made an extravagant ? f f: ori- to
dramatize the Ussuri clashes in their '1ai.lv newspapers,
trading denunciations and striving hard to vilify ear: 1* 1
others' leaders to the outside world."' These denuncia-
tions abated only slightly after May 11, when the ^RC
accepted the (third) Soviet proposal to hold the 15th
regular meeting of their River Navigation Commission on June
IS. During the June-August talks the diplomatic tension a.ri- 1
incidence of clashes rose again. On August 13, a particu-
larly large clash occurred on the Xin jiann-Kasakhs tan
border, which "appeared to be the most serious Si no-Soviet
clash since the March 1969 incidents . " Pj This must have
pushed the Soviets too far. In mid-August, reports circula-
ted that the USSR was informally soundina out the <J . q .
reaction to a nuclear attack on the PRC . ° On August IS,
1969, Pravda aired the possibility of a nuclear war with
China,-'-" and in September a Soviet Deputy Defense
Minister raised the possibility that Moscow mioht initiate a
"preventive" war should it be necessary. 11
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3y this time, saner counsel prevailed. In the midst of
this very tense situation both parties availed themselves of
an impromptu opportunity to settle matters peaceably.
Soviet Premier Kosygin stopped off at Beijing airport while
returning from Ho Chi-Minh's funeral in Hanoi (September,
1969). While at the airport, he was met by ?^C Premier Chou
En-la i, and they reached an agreement to defuse the situa-
tion by negotiation. In October both sides opened negotia-
tions to settle tbeir border dispute. ^ i s cot'Tenc*1 ' 1 ti ?.
series of talks that continues today.
F. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1970-1983
It is characteristic of this period that the talks began
in 1969 have remained stalled over an agenda. The Soviet
Union has consistently pushed for a broad agreement of prin-
ciples, or even a non-aggression treaty. The PRC has always
countered that no substantive issues may be considered until
the border problems have been resolved. Neither side has
been willing to- 'compromise its position in a bid for
improved relations. The negotiations will be examined in
more detail in chapter five.
Meanwhile, the USSR and PRC remain polarized over events
in the international arena. The USSR was very disturbed by
the rapprochement between the PRC and US symbolized by
Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Conversely, the PPC was
upset at the growing US-Soviet detente marked by the signing
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of the SALT I accords. The US evacuation of Vietnam '1973)
and the victory of the Vietnamese communists (1975) were
ostensible victories for the greater Communist movement.
The Chinese feared, correctly, that they presaged a predom-
inant Soviet influence in a country traditionally hostile to
China. Other divisive events included, the Sino-Japanese
peace treaty (1 Q 78), the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea
(1978), the PRC invasion of Vietnam and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan (197^).
The events have created difficult problems for improving
Sino-Soviet relations. Nonetheless, beginning in 197 Q each
country made tentative overtures to renew the normalization
talks. 12 Following Brezhnev's death in late 1982, sore
progress has been indicated despite interruptions caused by
Vietnam and Afghanistan. Propoganda attacks have been muted
and the talks have been characterized in a much more favor-
able light by each country. No new border incidents have
been reported, and trade between the two countries has
grown. 13 Finally, the latest visit by the Soviet nego-
tiation team in September, 1983, was an official visit to
the Chinese government. It was the first official visit in
two decades . *-^
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III. MATURE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE
A. IDEOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE
The USSR considers that Marxist-Leninist ideology is a
'scientifically' valid tool capable of predicting history.
State policy must act in concert vith ideological truths to
achieve the communist level of development. Anything else
would be contrary to the reason for the state's very exi -
tence . It is the purpose of the Communist Party to deter-
mine the proper policy for the state to follow in accordance
with these principles. The Party justifies its existence
and monopoly of political power by claiming to be the only
instrument capable of ensuring that policy is correct. This
is the only legitimization for authority in the rTC^SR.
Therefore, the Party as a whole cannot afford to be wrong,
and is not
.
Any mistakes in policy are attributed to individuals or
factions. The public position of individual CPSU leaders is
that their exercise of power is justified because of their
correct policy decisions. The logical outcome is that while
a leader of the CPSU is in office, his policy is always cor-
rect. It is only after a leader is ousted that his policies
may be publicly referred to as wrong, mistaken or less than
optimum. It 'is simultaneously an explanation of existing
2R
shortcomings of state policy and a justification for the new
leader's assumption of power.
Admitting a previous leader's mistakes does have its
drawbacks. The concept that the Party cannot he wrong,
while individuals may have been, is tenuous and dangerous.
After all, Soviet leaders only act collectively as represen-
tatives of the CPSU. Power is not vested in them as indivi-
duals. The extension is that Party policy was wrong as
well. Tt is obvious to conclude that i f past leaders'
policies can be wrong, so can those of the current leader^,
and the Party 1 For this reason, condemnation of previous
leaders is not frequently' employe^. The first use of this
ploy at the highest level--Khrushchev at the Twentieth CPSU
Congress-- caused consternation and commotion in the world
communist movement.
Even though both the USSR and PRC expouse a communist
ideology, their interpretation and application of communist
principles has greatly differed. This is an extremely
troublesome issue to Soviet ideologues. Marxism-Leninism
knows no national boundaries. It is universally valid in
scope and application. Two countries operatina under this
same ideology cannot maintain dissimilar, and even mutually
exclusive, policies. The problem is fivefold.
First, one of the positions must be wrong, and for the
reasons outlined about, it can-not be the USSR's. But
attributing fault to the other country— and weakening its
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leadership—may not be feasible if that country is an ally
(as was China from 1 949-1962) . T^is puts a nre.mium on
keeping differences private. Only when differences become
too obvious, and public, is this course unfeasible.
Second, once the debate is public, the USSR is inevi-
tably subject to denunciations similar to its own from the
other country. In spite of official ridicule seeds of joubt
might be spread in the Soviet populace.
Third, other communist parties are faced with m^os i m
between the two positions, thus splitting an'1 weaken inn the
world communist movement.
Fourth, other communist parties mjnht intprpret an unre-
conciled split as indicative that maybe neither si- q e is
correct, and develop their own path to communism. This
could lead to disaster for the world communist movement.
Without a viable Marxist-Leninist ideology, every communist
party's legitimacy is threatened.
Fifth, the option of simply declaring a deviant country
no longer Marxist-Leninist is unpalatable. It would imply
that the process of communist revolution is reversible.
This is not impossible. Temporary setbacks along the road
to full communism are to be expected. The problem is that
by no stretch of the imagination could China's reverting to
the capitalist camp— of its own will --be construed minor or
easily correctable. It would reverse • a historically
'objective' event. This would either destroy a major
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ideological ^enet or the credibility and reputation c f a
generation of ideologists. Such a major 3efeat would
impinge on even the most credulous citizen's belief in the
viability of the communist ideology and its interpreters.
Furthermore, it would be difficult to isolate only one
country or faction. Excommunication could easily create
more problems than it would solve. Little short of national
survival would override these considerations.
The potential problems of multiple centers of authority
indicate the importance of unity w/ithin the world rommc^is
t
movement. The USSR, as the world's first socialist country,
the most experienced and the most successful, considers its
right to be the leader of world communism necessary and
self-evident. As such, its policies and programs should be
acknowledged by other parties. The CCP's refusal to ^o this
is a serious impediment to friendly relations between the
two countries
.
It is not necessarily an impediment to normalization of
relations. The CPSU has adopted a policy of peaceful co-
existence with fundamentally anti-Soviet regimes since 1956.
Typically, the Soviets use the term 'peaceful coexistence'
in conjunction with relations with non-communist countries.
However, Brezhnev has stated that, "Moscow was prepared to
settle outstanding differences [with the PRC] on the basis
of peaceful coexistence ." 1 The problem is that the
Soviets have always stopped short of excluding the PRC from
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the world socialist system. The PRC is still considered "a
member in bad standing" that has occasionally (frequently)
deviated from the 'true' tenets of Marxism-Leninism . -
This implies that some pro forma admission of past errors
and some degree of future commitment to Soviet leadership is
necessary by the GCP before relations can make much prog-
ress. The first might be as simple as agreeing to a non-
aggression pact. The latter will be more difficult, but the
Yugoslav example indicates how far the Soviets :i 1 1
towards international communist unity: Communist relations
".
. .need not., .be based on identity of doctrine, or even on
the pretense of such identity - only on agreement on some
vital points of doctrine, combined with practical solidarity
and absence of polemics. "3 The Soviets were stymied in
their desire for unity by Mao's intractability. Put it is
likely that their cessation of anti-PRC propaganda at Mao's
death, and later Hua's ouster, was to indicate their
willingness to receive the successor should he recant.
B. PERSONAL ANTIPATHY BETWEEN LEADERS
There is evidence that at least the beqinninas of the
dispute can be traced in part to personal dislikes between
Soviet and Chinese leaders. Khrushchev in his memoirs men-
tions how Stalin felt suspicious toward Mao and had a low
opinion of him, "What kind of man is Mao, anyway? He calls
himself a Marxist, but he doesn't understand the most
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elementary Marxist traths . Or maybe he doesn't want to
understand them.^ A more tangible display of Stalin's
dislike of Mao occurred during Mao's visit to Moscow in 1°'C
to seal the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. Stalin pur-
posefully kept Mao waiting for two months in near isolation
before signing the treaty. Khrushchev, in turn, gives his
impression of Mao as outdated, impractical, and egotistic:
"...he expressed opinions and made grandiose claims that
were hopelessly outdated," and "Mao had wanted for a Long
time to be recognized by his people not only as a leader but
as a god . " ^
Intimately related to the leaders' personal feelings was
their stature within the international communist movement.
Stalin not only considered himself heir to Lenin's govern-
mental authoriy, but also to Lenin's ideological mantle.
Stalin considered Mao's early ideological innovations an
impertinence. After Stalin's death Mao believed his oenesis
of the only independently successful communist movement
apart from the USSR entitled him to preeminence. In spite
of the force of this argument, Khrushchev claimed the title
by virtue of being Stalin's direct successor. Considerable
ill-will was generated by these conflicts.
It is unlikely that the current leaders have experienced
much personal intimacy. Opportunities for personal contacts
have been very infrequent since the inception of the
dispute. Even though Deng Xiaoping had frequently been in
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Moscow_ when difficult negotiations were being conducted,
"Under Stalin there was a strict rule: if you weren't told,
you weren't meant to know and you'd better better not ask. "'
Any personal opinions remaining among the Soviet's top
leadership would probably be inherited from Stalin. The
strength of such feelings should not be minimized. Soviet
leaders today are a product of the Stalin era, and as
Khrushchev said, "...you don't free yourself from '"Stali-
nist] habits so easily." 7 Nixon reports that Brezhnev
said, "He was certain that the entire Chinese leadership was
instinctively aggressive."" At a lower level of leader-
ship, the Soviet negotiating team and embassy personnel in
the PRC are the source for current Soviet opinions of the
PRC ' s leadership. In private conversations, the current
Soviet Ambassador has spoken in a very deprecatory manner of
his Chinese counterparts.-
A realistic estimate of the impact of personal dislikes
for continuing the Sino-Soviet dispute would have to be low
in spite of their probable existence. Historically, politi-
cians have frequently been able to accept strange bedfellows
when it suited them.
C. THE DISPUTE OVER THE SINO-SOVIET BOUNDARY
For the eleven years from 1963-1974, the substance of
the dispute over the borders was contained in the March 9,
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1963 Chinese announcement that they no longer accented the
validity of the old 'unequal' treaties signed with Czarist
Russia. The USSR conceded that the old treaties were the
result of imperialist policies, but contended that they were
made in the face of an equally imperialistic power-- the
Chinese "mpire--and hence cancelled each other out. As
Khrushchev said:
As far as we were concerned, we weren't responsible for
what our czars had done, but the lands gaine^ from those
czarist treaties were now Soviet territory. . .We were
afraid that if we started remapping our frontiers
according to historical considerations, the situation
could get out of hand and lead to conflict. -^
The essence of the Chinese demand was for the USSR to recoc-
nize the treaties as 'unequal' , and reneaotiate the borders
on that basis. It was not a 'claim' for 600,000 square
miles of Soviet territory, as the Soviet press consistently
stated. But should the USSR have negotiatied under those
conditions, it would have been a tacit recognition that
Chinese claims to some amount of territory were valid. ^.is
it refused to admit.
The 1969 conflict over DamansV.y Island can be traced to
the vague terms of the Treaty of Peking (1P60), which estab-
lished the Ussuri River as the Siro-Soviet border. Mo men-
tion was made in the treaty of the river islands. In such
cases, international law stipulates the center of the main
channel, or thalweg
, becomes the boundary. ^ But the
Ussuri floods and shifts course, "changing the location of
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islands and thus bringing the issue of their sovereicr.ty
into question. ^-2
In 1.974, the PRC dropped its denand for recognition of
the 'unequal' status of the treaties, and has merely called
for renegotiation of border areas . This may refer to areas
such as Damansky, the Pamir Mountains in the south and other
areas of the 4,150 mile border that are either ill-define 1'
or are not specifically del iminated • However, the ' TSSR
continues to reject this demand on the principle that there
is no basis for such discussions. The Soviets are happy
with the borders as they exist. The USSR would prefer to
see the border issue confined to measures for preventinq
disputes from erupting again.
D. NATIONAL INTEREST
The concept of explaining a country's actions in terms
of its national interest is a familiar one. National
interest here is used to mean a country's primary vital
interests, such as national security and national pros-
perity, and its less tangible interests such as desired
level of national power and the elusive element of national
prestige. But the weight that should be assigned to
national interest for explaining Sino-Soviet relations is
not commonly agreed on. The position presented here is that
national interest is intimately related to ideology.
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An important facet of ideology is the precepts of those
who frame it. Marxist ideology became Marxist-Leninist as
Lenin found it necessary to tailor Marxism, to conditions in
the USSR. Similarly, the leaders of the CCP have found it
necessary to adopt their own interpretation of Marxism-
Leninism. This expression of national autonomy within
another communist country's ideological framework would he
most difficult to prevent unless complete control over that
country could be maintained. The USSR has been able to do
this with most of Eastern Europe, and to some dearee
Vietnam, ^ but has failed regarding China. Adoptinc the
new ideological principles involve^ in the de-Stalinization
campaign, the principle of peaceful coexistence and disarma-
ment talks with the US was traumatic even for the USS'3 , a
well-established and stable socialist state. Mao Zer'onc an ^
the leaders of the CCP contended that not only were these
innovations wrong in principle but that adoption of them by
the CCP would do much to negate the gains achieved in China.
Therefore, the ideological differences were based in some
measure on different perceptions of their respective
countries national interest.
At the Twentieth CPSU Congress - in 1956 Khrushchev
decided that despite the risks, to best promote Soviet inte-
rests modern times required another shift in ideology.
These changes included the principle of peaceful coexis-
tence, de-Stalinization, de-satell ization and relaxina
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societal controls. To the Soviet leaders' 3ismay, these
policies fostered some results contrary to Soviet national
interests both internally and externally. A few elements of
the Soviet populace committed 'excesses' of personal free-
dom, and Eastern European countries like Hungary and Poland
became too lax in their- domestic politics. Hungary's case
actually required Soviet military intervention to restore
'order' . In 1960, the CPSU Central Committee resolved
step up propaganda and ideoloaica 1 work to 1) just.i c y the
changes; 2) halt 'abuses'; and 3) define new limits for
the ideological changes so that they were more in accord
with Soviet interests.^ The point is that while
excesses committed under the changes caused problems in
Soviet foreign policy, the changes were not intended to do
so
.
The importance to the Soviets of their national interest
was displayed when the Chinese gained a convert in Albania.
This vulnerability within their own sphere disturbed them
greatly. It was too serious to ignore, but Khrushchev had
already removed the Cominform as an instrument to handle the
issue. Forcing the issue at a conference of world communist
parties was explored, but never employed, because it was
only an option if it could succeed, and the PRC had already
made clear that was impossible. Failure would only compound
the problem by putting an official stamp on two ideological
camps. To protect their national interest they were forced
3R
to abandon the recently adopted ir'eclccical changes. Tn the
case of Albania, as later in the case of the °PC , t^e
Soviets were, "...forced back to the 'Stalinist' use of
state power in inter-communist relations. . . "^ for lack
of an effective method of inter-Party control.
The issue of disarmament and peaceful coexistence was
more a matter of national interest for the USSR than it was
for the PRC. As a military and nuclear superpower in its
own right, the USSR felt constrained to adopt a lonrr-term
view of the capitalist-communist conflict. Lone before,
radical policies of world revolution had been discarded by
Stalin. Communism will eventually triumph over capitalism,
but such a "victory" after a nuclear war would be a catas-
trophe. Soviet leaders determined that in the modern w/orld,
"The principal role of Soviet military power r should be 1 to
dissuade imperialist powers from resort to their military
power."-'-" The propriety of arms talks looically fol-
lowed, as did the principle of peaceful coexistence. From
the Soviet view, Khrushchev's comment about Mao being "out-
dated" is particularly appropriate here. Khrushchev felt
that as a communist state, the PRC was inextricably involved
with the USSR. Safeguarding the USSR from nuclear war was
in effect safeguarding the PRC.
The Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 indicated a formal blend-
ing of ideology and national interest in Soviet foreign
policy relations with other socialist countries. As
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sovereign states Communist countries ha ,r e traditionally
functioned
:
...in three distinct international or transnational
environments: 11 the Communist interstate sub-syster1 ;
2) the general international system; and 3) the world
of Communist Parties ... the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', for the
first time, insinuated purely Party principles into the
behavior of Communist states in their capacities as
rr embers of the general international community , i.e., it
limits their autonomy as states, not simply as
Parties . ]- 7
The distinction from the Soviet view is purely nominal.
Communist states are aoverned by Communist Parties, >-/~^i •'
must already conform to CPSU leadership. But other Parties
than the CPSU clearly perceive that the juridicial intent o c
the doctrine allows the USSR complete leeway to ensure the
ideological and national interests of the USSR are pro-
tected. Blurring the state/Party distinction blurs the
ideology /national interest demarcation. It elevates the
national interest to the status of ideoloay.
An alternative method of lookinq at the problem miaht be
that ideology's importance was lowered, while that of the
national interest was raised. Taking this proposition fur-
ther results in an estimate put forward by Seweryn Bialer,
"The leadership in both countries is looking frantically for
an ideological underpinnino for the current conflict. "i p
This recognizes the imperative a sound ideological base has
for their leaderships' legitimacy, but it also implies a
cynical, retroactive application of the ideology. Some of
this probably exists, but it is much more likely that
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leaders raised within the ideology genuinely believe it.
Real world events that present conflicts of ideologv and
national interest must trouble Soviet leaders. T^eir only
solution to the shortcomings of their ideology is a commit-
ment to the propriety of their decisions. This will make it
all the more difficult for the PRC and T^SR to reconcile
their differences over US-PRC detente, the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, Soviet aid to Vietnam and Soviet troon
dispositions alona their common border.
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IV. CRISTA IN THE SOVIET SC UEME
The previous historical review of Sino-Soviet relations
and the details of the dispute's origin leave out an impor-
tant element that impacts on current Sino-Soviet relations.
The general attitude of the Soviets toward China an" the
Chinese underlies the basis of the Soviets' China policy.
It includes the emotional and cultural feelincs o c hhe
Soviets for the Chinese, the priority of the 'China Problem'
in Soviet politics, and the relative military situation.
A. SOVIET NATIONALISM
The USSR is officially a multinational country. a s
such, all ninety -two ethnic nationalities (as o^ the 1^7 9
census) enjoy completely equal status under the law. 1 The
right of nationalities to official recognition was guaran-
teed in both the 1936 and 1977 constitutions. In fact, the
state is organized on the basis of its national content.
The most numerous nationalities compose the fifteen
Socialist Republics, smaller nationalities are accorded
lesser status. This official Soviet position on nationali-
ties is in full accord with Marxist-Leninist irieolocy, as
was covered previously. The minority nationalities (non-
Slavs) benefit from this policy in many ways. No official
prohibition exists to' prevent their access to education,
jobs, military service or the CPSU. Many have taken
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advantage ' of this to improve their position in Soviet
society
.
The official line regarding foreign nationalities is
similar. All nationalities and races are recognized as
equals in the struggle against capitalism. The USSR
frequently propagandizes this and points with pri^e to
itself as an example for other multi-ethnic nations to
follow.
The true picture of ethnicity within the USSR is -iic^n
more complex, and is beyond the scope of this par^r
explore in depth. But basically, the USSR is dominated by
Slavs, and particularly Russian Slavs and Ukrainians. Since
Stalin, determined efforts have been made to Russify Soviet
society. In some cases this has succeeded, but ranv minor-
ity nationalities, especially the Muslims, stubbornly clino
to their national heritage and traditions. What is worse,
demographic trends indicate that the Slavic population is
declining relative to the Islamic nationalities in central
Asia. Since the Slavic and European nationalities of the
northern Soviet Union have traditionally been the most
productive in industry and agriculture, the demographic
shift presents a problem for the Soviet economy. Unless the
Soviets institute corrective measures, a serious decline in
industrial and agricultural products will result. A serious
level of resentment is already growing among northerners at
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the necessity to distribute their product amona the
unproductive southerners .
In spite of official intolerance, racist attitudes are
prevalent in Soviet society. This is especially true
between European and Muslim nationalities. Central Asian
nationals are looked down upon by Slavs who consider ther
stupid and dull-witted. Considerable racial strife has been
reported within the military. ^ Additionally, Slavs are
well aware that minority nationalities 'rave in the pas 1: he^r
disloyal to the regime, e.g., a quarter of the German man-
power on the eastern front was composed of non-Slavic
deserters from the USSR.-3 For this reason, the Soviet
leaders have often considered minority nationalities
untrustworthy. An example is Krushchev's refusal to use
Georgian troops to quell a 1956 riot in Tbilisi.
4
Soviet cultural attitudes towards Chinese nationals are
infected with the same racism and suspicion. In 1°59,
Khrushchev was unhappy with Chinese students who .staged
incidents in the USSR: "They were supposed to be cultured
people, but they are nothing by swine."- Soviet propagan-
dists found it easy to whip up anti-Chinese sentiment at the
time of the 1969 border clash. Andrei Amalrik -relates that,
"One can hear nowadays in Russia remarks like 'The United
States will help us because we are white and the Chinese are
yellow.' "° And a famous poet, Yevgeny Yevtu.shenko,
referred to the Chinese as the new "Khans". These remarks
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are indicative of the Russian fear of the "yellowing" of
their society and of the "yellow peril " across the border.
Soviet leaders with these attitudes would find it easy to
accept a Sino-Soviet split.
B. CHINA IN SOVIET PRIORITIES
The PRC is not first among Soviet priorities in spite of
its antagonistic policies and contiguous border. T^e USSP's
opposite number in the capitalist camp, the US, occupies
first priority with the Soviets. T^e USSR has traditionally
been and still is oriented towards the West. Larcelv
because of this and the German invasion of the USSR in WWII
the Soviets' next two priorities are Eastern and Western
Europe, in that order. East Asia, including Asia, then fol-
low Europe. This order is by no means absolute. Individual
events certainly may temporarily rearranoe regional priori-
ties for the Soviets. But this order has been repeatedly
born out over the last decade.
Within East Asia ascertaining Soviet priorities is much
more difficult. The contest is between Japan and the PRC.
Japan's military capability is not high but it is an econ-
omic superpower with the world's second highest ONP. China
probably edges out Japan primarily due to its contiguous
border with the USSR and immense army, alona with its
avowedly anti-Soviet policy.
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The aforementioned history of Sino-Scviet relations can
give the misleading impression that the Soviets have prima-
rily been interested in China. It is useful to remember the
PRC ' s relativly low position in Soviet priorities when con-
sidering the Sino-Soviet dispute. Some elements of the
dispute's origin can be attributed to Beijing's dissatisfac-
tion with this. Mao was infuriated when, on Soviet institu-
tion, the PRC was excluded from talks on the Partial "^sr.
P~an Treaty (December, 195P); and aaain when the Soviets sum-
marily refused to supply the Chinese with th<= sample ato^-> -'
bomb they had promised (June, 1°5 Q ). Both o c these moves
were made in accordance with Krushchev' s hie 1" priority
disarmament negotiations with the US.
Soviet concern with the PRC and East Asia is relatively
recent. Many factors are responsible for the rise of the
PRC, and East Asia in general, in Soviet priorities since
Stalin. The conflict with the PRC was one, but just as
important were: the transition of the USSR to a global
power capable of power projection to the Third World, the
growth of the strategic importance of South-East Asia, the
Second Indochina War, the growth of Japanese economic power,
Sino-Japanese normalization and the potential for an
American-Chinese-Japanese anti-Soviet alliance. Should the
latter alliance ever be cemented, it would rapidly become
the single most important Soviet concern.
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C. SOVIET MILITARY PERS PECTIVES QF IH^ PPC
1 . Geography *
Eefore proceeding to the details of the military
possibilities along the Sino-Soviet border it is necessary
to be familiar with the geography of the border. The
strategic geography shapes the nature of the threat each
country must guard, against.
The 4,150-mile Sino-Soviet boundary is the longest
two-nation border in the world. This excludes that se-— ent
occupied by Mongolia; although Mongolia hosts a number of
Soviet Red Army divisions, no border problems have resulted
with the PRC and Mongolia.
To the west, the Sino-Soviet boundary beoins in the
Pamir mountains at the junction of Afghanistan, t tSSP ^p.- 1 op d
territories. The Pamirs are the central core of the systems
of Central Asia. The Pamirs are of great elevation, and
generally increase in heiqht westward to 25,000 feet or
more. They are characterised by flat ridges and valleys,
the valleys are five to ten miles wide, while the ridges
average about 13,000 feet elevation (4,500 - 5,000 feet
above the valley floors.)
The frontier then runs generally north-east along a
complex of mountain ranges. Directly north is the Alai
range, similar to the Pamirs without the great lateral
See Map, Appendix A
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extensions. East and. west of the Mais are plains, the
Kirghiz steppes in the USSR and the Tarim Basin in the PRC.
The passes connecting the lowlands are steep, and quite high
(averaging 14,000 feet).
The east to west bend of the border follows the Tien
Shan mountains, which continue on into China an^ divide
Xinjiang Province. The Tarim Basin lays south, while the
Dzungarian Basin lays north. The Tarir^ is mostly uninhabit-
able iesert, with some steppe and swamp surround .1 nor mnun t^ ^ °
drainace areas. The Pzunaarian is" mostly steooe. "ortli o F
the Tien Shan, the Hi River cuts east-west an 1 provides a
natural route across the border. The eastern border of the
Dzungarian Basin is composed of the Alatau mountains, which
run north to the Altai. The Alataus and Altais are rela-
tively low and unspectacular, but provide a sufficient
obstacle to overland traffic. The Dzungarian Gates are the
famous pass across the border in the Alataus, it is a ten-
mile long gorge at only 700 feet above sea level. From here
east into China proper is the Kansu Corridor, a narrow route
between the Gobi Desert on the north and the Tibetan moun-
tains on the south. To the east of the Alataus is Soviet
Turkestan, which ends at the Altais.
East of Mongolia, the border is defined by the
Argun, Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Running north along the
Argun is the Greater Khinqan mountain range; following the.
Amur east to the Ussuri junction is the Lesser Khinaan
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range. The Khingans are only about 6,000 feet elevation in
the south, gradually iecreasina to about 4,°00 feet in the
north and east. This is sufficient to contain the ronsoonal
precipitation, and hence the Manchurian lowlands are fertile
and heavily forested. Swamps extend from the junction o^
the Amur and Ussuri south along the Ussuri .
2 . The Military Situation Along The Sino-Foviet Border
a. Military Force Levels
Following the outbreak of hostilities in l ^
,
it became clear to the USSR that the D RC prespnte^1 a ~i n i
-
tary threat. The seriousness of the situation, was indicated
by the Soviet reaction. Within three years, the number of
Soviet troops along the border had doubled to 4^0, onn ren.
Grantino that a threat exists, the question is one <^ c
degree. What kind of threat does the PRC pose to the USSR?
Table I below indicates the current force levels
each nation has in the border region (as of 1°83).
b. The Military Balance
The data in Table I is a quantitative compari-
son, and requires a qualitative element to accurately
reflect the relative force levels. Generally, this drasti-
cally alters the situation in favor of the Soviets. Soviet
military equipment is plentiful and incorporates modern
technology. Cninese equipment is largely obsolescent; what
little modern equipment they have is in scarce quantity.
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effective. Chinese training has been hampered by lack o^
equipment and political disruption. Soviet military doc-
trine competently employs the latest concepts of modern war-
fare. Chinese doctrine is inflexible and relies on outmoded
Maoist concepts. These comparisons impinge equally on each
of the military branches.
Soviet nuclear forces are second to none in the
world, and are perhaps even superior to those of the United
States. They certainly far outstrip the Chinese. ^eir
delivery systems are well-diversified between 'modern
bombers, equally modern solid fuel ICBM ' s , IRBM ' s , MP " ' s ,
SLBM ' s and tactical nuclear delivery systems (FROG-7^. They
are reliable and increasingly accurate. Their supply o^
warheads targeted at the PRC overwhelmingly exceeds the
PRC ' s . This includes a wide ranoe of meqatonnaoe for flex-
ible employment. PRC nuclear forces are limited in almost
every variable. Their strategic bombers, copies of TU-16
"Badger A's" are disregarded by the Soviets, "who judge it
obsolescent as a bomber. "° Chinese nuclear credibility
resides in their missiles. These are widely dispersed and
well-concealed, and the CSS-1 and CSS-2 have some mobility.
But the total numbers are relatively few; and all are liquid
fueled and, "extremely vulnerable to attack (conventional as
well as nuclear) once launch preparations begin."
-
The potential size of the- Soviet ground forces
is. not indicated in Table I. Of the fifty-two divisions
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only about fifteen percent are Category & , thirty-five
percent are Category 3 and the regaining fifty percent are
Category C* At full mobilization the total numbers of
troops would swell to nearly two million men. The Category
A divisions are closest to the Manchuriaa border. Even
without mobilization these trained, well-equipped an"1
supplied troops ara "quite capable of defending the Soviet
Far East and undertaking minor offensive operations."
Given tine for mobilization, the additional two m i n i tt: -e
would provide much areater strength and flexibility for an '
operation short of full invasion and occupation.
The- Chinese People's Liberation ?\rmy (PIA^
deploys roughly 1.5 million of its 3.6 million ground forces
alonq the border. ( Mote: The PLA is a unified ser 'ice
which includes the air force and navy as well as around
forces. For the purposes of this paper, the former two will
be considered separately.) Of the approximately 100
divisions, two- thirds are main force ( MF ) divisions and the
remaining third are local force (LF) divisions. T^e MF
divisions are better and more fully equipne^ that the LF
* Soviet procedure is to man most of their divisions with
only a cadre of essential personnel. In times of need, the
divisions are brought up to full strength with reserves.
Soviet divisions are divided into three categories depending
on their standard amount of undermanninn : Category A
—
divisions are at 80-100 percent readiness; Category B—
divisions at 30-50 percent readiness; and Category C
divisions at 5-10 percent readiness .^
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divisions, which are intended for static defense and border
defense. 'Better' is a distinctly relative proposition.
"Many of the MF divisions still rely partly on horsedrawn
transport, and little more than light infantry divi-
sions.. . . "12 Pack mules might be an advantage in t-he
jungles and steep mountains south of the Yangtze River , but
the north is ideal terrain for mechanized forces. """^e nr '-
is woefully short of self-propelled artillery, heavy trucks,
and modern armorer] personnel carriers. Soviet tank divi-
sions and Chinese armored divisions are comparably struc-
tured, taut the PLA ' s tanks are mostly old versions of "ov.iet
T-54's, while the Soviets use T-64 ' s/-72 ' s . One strength ? c
the PLA is its superb individual training. Tie Chinese
infantryman is tough and practiced in fighting at :lose
quarters
.
The Soviet air force is a modern, all-weather
force. It employs excellent ground control an^ aircraft
radars and electronics. Its 2,000 combat aircraft are
equipped with modern armaments, including effective air-to-
air and air-to-ground missiles. There are significant
numbers of the latest aircraft types, including Backfire
bombers, MiG-27 fighter-bombers and MiG-25 fighters.
The Chinese air forces have respectable numbers
but are virtually all of 1950 's vintage. For example, 3,600
of the 4,000 fighters are MiG-17 and MiG-19 copies. There
are only about 100 J-7 ' s (versions of MiG-21 ) deployed. m^e
55
latest Chinese effort, the F-S , a delta-winged interceptor,
is only a marginal improvement of the J-7 . Moreover,
"Nearly all the ... fighter interceptors of the PLA Air Force
and PLA Naval Air Force are effective only in daylight and
fair weather. "13
The Soviet navy is one of the world's two best
by any measure. Its Pacific Fleet comprises rouah.ly a cruar-
ter of the entire Soviet Navy, more if measured by sub-
marines alone. Tt is a very stronn fleet as ^easu^""1 by
either hardware or operational experience. 'he ^°S' na^y, on
the other hand, is mentioned as being the second largest in
the world when measured by its total number of shins an 1
men. In fact it is very weak in both hardware and opera-
tional experience. The Soviets have an overwhelm i no advan-
tage in long range submarines and major surface craft, both
of which employ anti-ship and anti-land missiles. Soviet
armament is large, powerful and plentiful. The PRC has no
ships larger than a destroyer, and all its technology is
outmoded. Its weaponry is almost entirely short range guns
and torpedoes. In essense, the PRC navy is useful only for
coastal defense. The Soviet navy is an experienced open-
ocean navy. In spite of its size, the PRC navy could really
only oppose the Soviet's by extensive use of mines. TJnfor-
tunately, there is little data on Chinese minewarfare
capability.
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Even this brief comparison of Soviet and Chinese
force levels makes clear that thouch outnumbered , the
Soviets have the substantially superior forces. But an.
assessment of the overall military balance should review two
other factors: military doctrine and the strategic
framework
.
Military doctrine includes military tactics an^1
strategy, and the operational 'style' of the ar^.e* 1 forces in
combat and command. Soviet land forces have the 7 u a n t i *• '
and sophistication of material to practice and e f p ic
i
QO t 1 v
employ modern combined arm concepts. Heavy infantry, massed
armor and air support are combined to wield a theoretically
devastating punch. Their forces are mobile and well
directed by advanced techniques of command, control and com-
munications (C^). The PLA 'People's War' tradition o p
light infantry and guerrilla warfare is quite different. It
is inherently defensive, and relies on mass mobilization and
protracted fighting. As a strategy for opposina Soviet
attack it is manifestly unsuitable. The Chinese recognize
this, and over the last decade have emphasized the need for
the PLA to modernize for 'People's War Under Modern Condi-
tions' . Military modernization is one of the current
leader's goals under the 'Four Modernizations' procram,
albeit the one with least priority. But the PLA has far to
go before it realizes any significant improvement.
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Since the PLA was organized after, and' with the
help of, the Red Amy, it is no surprise to note their simi-
lar structure. Their command style is likewise similar.
Both armies operate under a hiahly centralized command where
relatively little initiative is left to lower levels. With
their modern communications equipment the Soviets are
probably much more efficient at it than the Chinese, but for
the same reason more rigid. The PLA ' s 'People's War 1
concept benefits from the flexibility of a less inte^ra^e- 3
command structure. The combat style of each country's
troops is quite comparable. Both country's soldiers are
tough, adaptible, and determined.
The strategic situation is hiahly unfavorable to
China. Xinjiang in the west is lightly populated by mostly
non-Han peoples, and is isolated from the rest of China
except for one rail line. Yet, it is easily accessible to
the Soviets from Central Asia or from the Mongolian People's
Republic (MPR). From the MPR, a Soviet satellite, the
Soviets can also strike south into the Kansu Corridor, and
from there either east toward Beijing or south into central
China. The Chinese territory facing this threat is again
lightly inhabitated and is not easily defensible althouah
Han peoples are now in the majority. In the north-east is
Manchuria, China's industrial center. It is surrounded on
three sides by Soviet territory and hence is extremely
vulnerable to a pincer movement. The PLA has concentrated
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its best forces in the Beijing military region for this rea-
son. These major routes are actually the traditional ones
by which China has been invaded for the last 3,hqo years.
It is ironic that the PRC capitol is vulnerable-- the Mongols
situated it at Beijing during the only time in Chinese
history when the threat came from the south .
In theory, the Soviets also have cause to worry.
Should China ever realize the full might of its potential,
the fears of Kuropatkin in 1 Q 16 might be vali^: "China
could strike through the Dzungarian Basin and thereby cut
the Russian Empire in half. "14 in a mere practical
sense, the Soviets in Eastern Siberia are at the far end of
a very long supply line. The Soviets are dependent on the
Trans-Siberian railway for much of their new supplies. T^.e
only other routes are the northern (closed by ice eight
months of the year) and southern sea lanes. The Trans-
Siberian passes within ten miles of the Chinese border at
some points, • and thus is vulnerable to determined Chinese
raids. The Soviets have alleviated this problem in two
ways. They have prepositioned enormous stockpiles of
military supplies, and they are constructing a second rail
line, the Baikal-Amur (BAM), farther from the border.
In the final analysis, of course, the true test
of the military balance can only be determined in actual
war. Short of this, it would appear the Soviets have a
definite advantage. A method of more definitely assessing
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the military balance is proposed by R.H.S. Stolfi. In his
estimate the factors of numbers of men, weapons, weapon's
characteristics, military doctrine and strateaic framework
are not simple agaregates
.
Each factor contributes decisively to the strength of
the combat forces, and the ineffectiveness of any sinrl*=
one could result in the collapse of the whole. Tn
mathematical analooy, the factors are multiplicative an'1
the product... is zero whenever any included factor is
zero . * 3
This method hiqhliqhts the Chinese inferiority. """He'/ -re
crucially weak in numbers and quality of weapon: a n f'e L
subsequent military doctrine. Unless Chinese leaders are
bent on suicide, the choice of military confrontation lies
entirely with the Soviets.
The options available to the Soviets, if thev
were to decide on military action, must now be considered.
3. Military Plannina Considerations
a. Soviet Military Options
The field of military operations available to
the Soviets is very wide. The concern of this section is to
examine the entire range of options solely by the criteria
of military feasibility. Tn this reaard , the study by
Donald Daniel and Harlan Jencks is very appropriate.-^
They present six graduated military options for the USSR
that are representative of the entire spectrum of options
.
With each option they consider the probable Chinese
response. Since these scenarios would be affected by any
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intervention cf the US, possible US responses are also
evaluated for each Soviet option. This is an extremely
useful model and is presented in condensed form below.
( 1 ) Option One; Sponsoring- Rebellion
This Soviet option would be intended to
take advantage of the non-Han majority residina in Xinjianrr.
These Muslim peoples have been subjected to harsh 5 indica-
tion and are certainly disaffected with their Chinese
rulers, especially when they compare the relatively ben inn
treatment the related minorities in Soviet Central ^~i~ b^ve
received. Along the rest of the border the Han are now in
the majority, but if sufficiently incited, or even armed,
minorities could cause considerable disruption. As men-
tioned elsewhere, it has been reported that the Soviets iia -.^
already used this tactic to indicate their displeasure with
the PRC.
The immediate Chinese response would be to
forcibly quell any disturbances. The only long-term solu-
tion is to redress the injustices done to the minorities and
begin to raise their standard of living. This has been
addressed by the current Chinese leadership. Attempts by
the Chinese to use this option against the Soviets would be
difficult in view of their past record of intense
Sinification and subjugation of minorities.
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The best assistance the US could provide
would be to boost PRC propaganda capabilities -vitv
communication equipment.
( 2 ) Option Two; Maritime Disruption
The Soviets have wide latitude to interrupt
Chinese merchant and fishing fleets and offshore ^rilling.
This could ranae from interference with, to attacking, these
targets. Their loss would be serious in itself, not
counting the future damage to the Chinese economy.
The Chinese resoonse depends on vhere the
Soviets choose to operate. If the interdiction occurs out-
side the East and South China Seas, the P^C would be help-
Less. Within these seas the PRC would still have trouble
with Soviet submarines, and if used, nines . nnly closer in
to the mainland would the PRC navy be able to hinder Soviet
operations. Any attacks on Soviet shipping by the PRC would
likely be thwarted by rerouting shipping out of the threat
area
.
US aid in the form of intelligence data and
escort services could greatly help the PRC, but the latter
risks conflict with the Soviets. If the US and USSR were
willing to enter limited naval engagement, US ai^ could be
extended to minesweeping and pacifying the coastal seas.
Clearing them would require more assets than the US coul^
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afford to devote— this is even truer reaardino open ocean
areas •
( 3 ) Option Three: Bombard China
The USSR could easily penetrate the P^C to
conduct selected— or general—bombing. This would be the
optimum method to provide flexible, controlled destruction.
Depending on intent, the targets could ranee from military
outposts to industrial centers. The attack could be either
conventional or nuclear. A successful Soviet first strike
would, eliminate enouoh Chinese launchers to ensure a minim*!
?RC counter-response.
Since PRC air defenses are almost non-
existent, they could not stop such an attack. Their air
fields and nuclear missiles would probably be pre-emoti vely
destroyed. The choice of launching their surviving nuclear
missiles could only provoke a massive counter-attack. A
possible response could be larqe scale guerrilla rai^s into
Soviet territory. They might do significant damage to the
Trans-Siberian Railroad and local populace before being
stopped. It might also escalate to a Soviet response in
kind .
In this instance, US aid would be of
limited value. Arms transfers of anti-war weapons and
intelligence would be best, but adequate amounts of material
simply could not be provided.
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( 4 ) Option Four: Punitive ? a i d s
The Soviets coul^ send troops onto Chinese
territory at' their discretion. Their mission character
could be repeats of the earlier border incidents or destruc-
tive raids reaching deep into China. Depending on the
mission the number of troops might total several divisions.
The Chinese would, of course, attempt
meet the intruding forces and destroy then. °-ut once f e
Soviets are across the border, the PLA wonnl-'l '•r? e n a rp q "; ;»
to keep up with a highly mobile force. Only a large ra i A ^^
long duration would be subject to guerrilla attrition. *s
in Option Tnree, a Chinese counter raid would risk
escalation
.
The ^ost practical US aid in this case
would, be intelligence forewarning the raid.
( 5 ) Option Five: Dismemberment
In this option, the Soviet objective would
be occupation of the PRC ' s most vulnerable territories:
Xinjiang and Manchuria. Both these targets would require
Soviet mobilization to succeed. Xinjiana would be a much
easier target because of its weak defenses, shorter Soviet
supply lines and possibly welcomina population. The Soviets
would be virtually assured of success. Manchuria woul^ be a
much more difficult task. It is strongly defender!, its bor-
der terrain is more defensible, it has a larae anti-Soviet
population and Soviet logistics are more difficult. Je'ncks
64
estimates it would cost ten divisions an." require twenty to
thirty more for occupation, but it could be r'one.
The Chinese would try to stop either
assault at the border passes. In Xinjiang, the best they
could do would be to slow the Soviet advance. Once through
the passes there is little hope of containment. Reinforce-
ments could not arrive in time. In Manchuria, there is =i
slight possibility the Soviets might not break through
before entailing unacceptable losses. Once thrnuah, the
Soviets would still face stiff resistance ^rom the PLV
s
best units and a hostile population. It is unlikely the
Soviets would use tactical nuclear weapons for fear of full-
scale retaliation by the PRC. For their part, the Chinese
would hesitate to initiate massive Soviet retaliation by
launching a nuclear first strike.
As in Option Four, there is little air!
beside forewarning intelligence the US could provide the
PRC.
(6 ) Option Six: Invasion
This scenario is similar to Option Five in
its initial stages . The difference is that once through the
passes the Soviets would continue south all the way to the
Yangtze River. It would require a proportionally areater
Soviet effort in men and material. To go beyond the Yangtze
would probably require committing most of the Red Army.
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It is noteworthy that the Chinese are 'rest
prepared to respond to this most severe scenario. Their
traditional strengths of large scale, protracted guerrilla
warfare while operating out of remote bases is fully applic-
able. The PLA would succeed in making Soviet losses very
heavy. Factories in the south would be able to provide an
adequate supply of small arms indefinitely. It would be
extremely difficult for the Soviets to afford the long-term
costs of such an operation.
The US is well able to support the PRC
under this option. Key weapons shipments incl udinf portable
anti-tank and anti-war missiles, ^nd electronic warfare
devices would be invaluable. Surprisingly, the most Impor-
tant item the US might supply a war- torn PRC is food. m^is
has the added benefit of being non-provocative.
As a final matter, the US responses have
generally assumed the US was not at war with the USSR. A
state of war would make little difference in the amount of
direct aid the US could provide China given America's global
commitments. Indirectly, however, using forward bases in
China (as in WWII) to attack the USSR might sioni f lean t ly
increase the military pressure on the USSR,
b. Employment Posture
The six options outlined above are available to
Soviet military -planners. They represent a graduated scale
that gives Soviet political leaders great flexibility should
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they choose to implement force to coerce the PFC . The ques-
tion remains whether there is any indication the Soviets
have even considered using their military might against the
PRC. Equally valid is the PRC ' s perception of the answer to
this question.
Soviet military writing offers ample evidence
that they do seriously consider a conventional warfare con-
frontation with the PRC. It is typical of Soviet military
planners to seek guidance for future operations frcri pas':
history. In the case of war with the PRC they have repeat-
edly referred to the example of the 1945 Manchurian cam-
paign; "...the lessons stressed in the analyses .^ese^/e note
as probable indicators of elements in current Soviet strate-
gic planning."-'-' The Soviets were able to shift 1.5
million men across the continent within three months. The
campaign stressed mobilization, superior logistics and
armament, massed forces, speed of advance over improbably
difficult terrain and guerrilla assistance from local minor-
ities. It is no coincidence that the Soviets are currently
ready and able to duplicate these principles. In spite of
the costs--" it costs three times as much to maintain a divi-
sion in the Far East as in European Russia"^ 1 --the
Soviets have built up their land forces from fifteen divi-
sions in the 1950 's, thirty in the 1970 's, to fifty plus in
the 19S0's. The Pacific Fleet has had a commensurate
build-up. Erickson -notes that the military command's,
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"preparations to 'reactivate' the Far Eastern theatre d~
np.il itary operations [created for the 1°45 Manchurian cam-
paign and then disbanded]., .were well in hand towards the
end of 1972.... m1 - He stresses that, "There can he no
doubt over the strategic importance of this command organi-
zation, which includes some of the ablest and nost expe-
rienced senior qoviet officers . . . . ' - J It is cbvi rrjs
that the Soviets have purposefully taken the necessary steps
to ensure they possess all the conventional mil i t a c ' :r-ti ^"-
regarding conflict with p^c. Their willingness to ise t'~-~
was attested by Deputy Defense Minister ZaVharov's statement
durina the 1969 crisis that the USSR miaht initiate a
"preventative war" should it be necessary.-'-
The same process is evident for nuclear warfare.
The Soviets actually publically aired their consideration of
nuclear force during the 1969 border clashes. 1"- This
probably was intended as a reminder and warning to 'A?m that
the USSR could not be trifled with. Yet the Soviets have
since significantly upgraded their nuclear forces in Asia:
"...at the moment [1981] some 26 ICBM fields run north and
south of the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway, comprisina
3S-18s, SS-19s, SS-17s and SS-lls, as well as the modern
SS-20 IRBM, aimed at both China and Japan." 23 The
potential threat to the PRC is as great as ever despite the
PRC ' s own nuclear developement . Though the PRC now
possesses the beginninas of a diversified nuclear force it
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is not a fully credible deterrent. The Soviets may not be
able to destroy their, all. Even so, as Green and Yost say,
"The point, however, is not necessarily to destroy then all
but to destroy enough , so that the initial Chinese prelaunch
survivability problem becomes a penetrability problem ... r and




24 Certainly the Chinese believe the "/let
As Jencks ' translations of PRC press articles
reveals, "the Chinese are .under no illusions that the
Soviets will refrain from using their weapons o^ mass
destruction [in case of war with the PRC].""
The Chinese generally recocmize the inadequacy
of their military to deal with the Soviet threat. Jencks
notes that, "By the end of the l°70's the Chinese ha^ devel-
oped a realistically gloomy appreciation for .. .war fare .. .
with the Soviet Army.' -° They have therefore begun tak-
ing steps to modernize their forces. In spite of this, and
that they believe the threat is real, they apparently
believe there is no immediate danger from the USSR. Other-
wise military modernization would not be the last of the
'Four Modernizations' . Nor would the Chinese continue to
concentrate their military preparations for full-scale
Soviet invasion. They are only concerned with the lona-term
threat: "...Chinese strategic planning seems steadfastly to





7 The Chinese tested their belief
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in the reluctance of the Soviets to employ their forces .vith
the provocative 19 7 9 invasion of Vietnam: "We "hr^ 1 to
touch the rear end of the tiger and he didn't turn to fight
us. We think the rear end of the tiger can be touched. "-
4 . Political -Mil itary Constraints
The preceding discussion shows that the Soviets have
superior military forces compare""" to the Chinese/ t% a - thoy
can employ them at will, and that the Soviets have been
prepared to cic just that. T t seems incoac' ions : - v ^ -
Chinese do not feel any imminent threat.
It is a fact that the Soviets have not employed
their military against the PRC . Why not, since ther*= is
clearly a highly antagonistic relationship between them?
The Soviets have thrice acted militarily to control anti-
Soviet movements in other countries: Hungary in 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1978. Judging by
these actions the Soviet leaders would move forceably if it
was necessary and feasible. Therefore, it has not been
necessary, or it has been unfeasible, to use military force
against China. Which is the determining factor 9 And is it
still valid?
The solution to the problem has three elements:
the USSR has had no need to use force; 2) the USSR had no
need to but might in the future; and 3 s the USSR would have
used force but has been deterred.
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The first case contends that the USSR has no r.ee^ to
use force because the PRC is simply not a military threat
and it will never be one. Tn tandem with this thought is
the belief that China will fall apart of its accord; then
'properly progressive' forces could reinstitute control.
The events of the 'Great Leap Forward 1 and 'Cultural Revolu-
tion' certainly gave credence to the belief that the "FS r>
only had to wait out the Chinese. From its period of affi-
liation with the ?LA, the Soviet mil itary ~ M st ^ a -"«] n
acquainted with the limitations of the PL a. The or. 1 "/ events
the Soviets have real cause to fear is if the r DC acquires
massive amounts of Western military technology and aid, or
if the PRC commits itself to an anti-Soviet alliance with
Japan and the US. This explans the strident Soviet protests
over the possibility of either option. In retrosoect, the
Soviets recognize they had little cause for alarm.
-
Failure of the Chinese to conclude any substantial arms ''eal
with the West confirms William Tow's estimate that, "The
principle of eventually relying on indigenous Chinese
expertise to provide the PRC with a more credible military
force... is still paramount." 30 After all, the PRC
similarly rejected Soviet military development aid in
1958. 31 Likewise, Soviet leaders must realize that
there are small prospects for a successful ChineseWes tern
alliance when Chinese leaders have repeatedly sianalhed,
"that Chinese foreign policy will fly the banners o^
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'independence' and ' non-alignment ' ....•" 3? The Soviet
scholar Juri Chudodeyev acknowledges that, "In many aspects
it is important for China not only to demonstrate its inde-
pendence but actually not finding itself 'tailing' trie US
policy. " 33
The second case works on the assumption that whereas tv e
above was true till now, China's new leaders see-" t? ha-^
hit upon a modernity program with a cair measure '.or
success. This reflects upon comments suc V| as hn-i ' n
Zaqoria ' s
:
...since 1978, China has undertaken what amounts to
nothing less than a socioeconomic revolution at home and
a widespread opening up to the West.. .the reforms are
producinq results and seem likely to lead to further
economic growth .... The overall result has been a virtu? 1
dismantling of many Maoist institutions anl practices
and the taeginning of a movement toward a more open
society . 34
The Soviets view any strengthenino of China's economy, and
hence its military industrial complex, and any moves toward
a more open society as an anathema. Since in this case time
is on China's side, the theory is that there are, "...power-
ful arguments for moving against China before the present
margin of Soviet military superiority slips awavi . . .""
In this context any pattern of Chinese and Western coopera-
tion is a precedent that worries the Soviets. They,
"frequently reflect what a Moscow academic called a 'l a 41
complex' : a tendency to see collusion among the USSR's
neighbors . " 36 United State's policy is portrayed as
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attempting to use China against the USSR, much' as Britain
and France" (and Senator Truman) trier5 with Nazi Germany in
1941.
The third case is that the USSR would have used
force had it not been deterred from doing so. The basic
concept here is that the USSR believes it cannot afford the
costs of military action aoainst China. Any such action
would incur both immediate economic, material anr1 human
costs and consequential strategic and political cvsts
.
^xcept for the political co^ts, their extent woul'' be
directly proportional to the level of military intervention.
It is safe to assume the Soviets could easily absorb the
physical costs of military Ontions One and Two, and low
intensity bombing (Option Three) and raiding (Option Four 1) .
But the physical costs of escalating conflict increase
logarithmically— an annexation of Manchuria would severely
strain the Soviet economy. The exact extent is problem-
atical, but no Soviet leader could face the prospect with
equanimity. Since 1972, the lagging Soviet economy has
three times forced the leadership to slash long-term growth
investment.-^' Many Western economists predict that,
"...in time, a slow-down in consumption or defense or both
becomes unavoidable."^
Political and strategic costs are even more diffi-
cult to assess, but that element of risk applies equally to
Soviet calculations. Any level of military force miaht
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cement that which the Soviets cear— a P'RC /Western alliance.
Progaaanda value to the West (and PRCM alone would be inval-
uable. It would likely subvert the growing 'peace movement'
in Western Europe. It would certainly guarantee permanent
Chinese emnity and shatter any lingering Soviet hooes o tf
rarproachmen t . In any severe confrontation, there is the
risk of involvina the US and NATO in a two- front war, or
losing its hold on Eastern Europe. Just as disastrous would
be nuclear escalation worldwide. Brezhnev's l oo co r,i,^ent
that, "...after the destruction o^ Chinese nuclear sites by
our missiles, there won't be much time for the Americans to
choose between the defense of their Chinese allies and
peaceful coexistence with us, "3" is usually guoted for
its ominous aspect. But it also clearly recognizes the risk
of American involvement.
5 . Estimating the Potential for Conflict
There is only one situation that predicts any possi-
bility of Sino-Soviet military confrontation. That is if
the Soviets try to act mmilitarily to preempt a long-term
Chinese threat. This case postulates the Soviet's accept-
ance of incredible costs and risks for what is, after all,
only worst case thinking in the far future. Daniel and
Jencks estimate that even with US assistance, it would take
three decades to modernize the PLA enouah to defend aaainst
the Soviets, much less mount an invasion 40 If the last
three decades are any indicator, drastic alterations of
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the political climate could obviate any PRC threat at all .
Additionally, China's indigenous modernization is not at all
certain of success: even Zagoria believes "...substantial
obstacles remain," that might result in abandoning the
program. 41
The probability of a low intensity conflict occur-
ring is much greater than a high intensity conflict. But as
the intensity of conflict decreases, so do the objectives of
the conflict (and the potential gain) . T^e risks involved
are not necessarily lowered. Political risks and the threat
of escalation remain present. The cost-benefit analysis
that in the past has precluded low level conflict is equally
present now and in the future. Even more so as ^^C
capability increases.
Whether conflict has been determined by the Soviets
to be unnecessary, too costly or simply that there are
better diplomatic alternative to force, the answer remains
the same: the Soviets are very unlikely to initiate mili-
tary conflict in the foreseable future. There is only one
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V. SOVIET POLICY TO WAP D CHINA
The nature of the conflict between the USSR and PRC con-
ditions Soviet policy toward China. What the goals and
aspirations of Soviet Chinese policy are must be ascertained
by examining what Soviet policy has been, and from this
anticipate where it might lead. ^.e under lyina question is
whether the Soviets have been operatina on an ad hoc,
reactive and flexible basis or on one of adamant adherence
to basic principles. Examining Soviet diplomatic maneuvers,
the position of Soviet leadership and Soviet evaluations of
the PRC will hopefully provide the insight necessary tc
determine an answer.
A. SOVIET GESTURES OF ACCOMMODATION
This category of Soviet policies regarding China may be
likened to the 'carrot' side of a 'carrot and stick' charac-
terization. Many Soviet scholars find the 'carrot and
stick' characterization particularly apt for describing
Soviet policy toward China. * Why this is so is not clear,
as it appears justifiable to so ascribe all diplomatic
maneuvering. Nonetheless, Soviet enticements, as opposed to
warnings, will be considered here.
The on-going negotiation process itself has been a forum
for Soviet concessions to the Chinese. Formal negotiations
are a complex process that contain many nuances . One such
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attaches to the party that attempts to initiate negotia-
tions. Depending on the circumstances, so^e connotations
that may accrue to the initiator are: suing for peace,
operating from a weak position, conceding the existence of
the opponent's position and, not least, recognizing the
equal status of the opponent. After the flare up of border
fighting on March 2, 1969, the Soviets publicly called for
negotiations three times-- late March, April 12 and Aoril 26
— before the Chinese acceded. As the cycle of ta"! ks '.-,'ava
and waned, the Soviets consistently attempted to keep the"
going or proposed new avenues of approach. To is was dis-
played in 1971, 1973, 1976, 1979 and 1981. Mow, the MSS?
was clearly not in the position of the weak supplicant.
This made their aestures all the more maqnamirnous . It made
negotiations possible (since the Chinese were weaker, they
could not have begun the process without doing harm to their
position), and simultaneously soothed the Chinese. But the
repeated gestures by Moscow in itself gives credence to the
strength of the Chinese position. The Soviets have in addi-
tion consented in principle to Chinese counter-pronosa 1 s— as
in 1971 when they agreed to a statement of the border's
status quo and in 1982 about mutual troop reductions alone
the border--that in effect were tacit concessions over prior
Soviet positions. The Soviets had also indicated the
importance they attached to the talks , and • could be
interpreted as a gesture of respect to the Chinese, by
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naming Vasily Kuznetsov, the second highest official in
their Foreign Ministry, to head their delegation.
As opposed to symbolic gestures, the Soviets have also
proposed measures for accommodation in their own riant. T^e
primary example of this is the non-aggression treaty the
Soviets first proposed in 1971 and have reiterated
frequently since. Theoretically, such a treaty should
assuage Chinese fears of their (as the Chinese say} imperi-
alistic and hegemonial neighbor. Another index of relaxa-
tion of tensions is the settlement of bi-national agreef""?n ts
other than those in question. _The best example of this is
the joint Sino-Soviet Commission for Navigation on Boundary
Rivers. Again on Soviet initiative, the Commission has met,
albeit irregularly, and 'reached acrreement on technical
matters of border river navigation. Although such agree-
ments are obviously mutual, they are indicative of Soviet
willingness to settle some matters peaceably.
The Soviets have also availed themselves of technically
non-political conciliatory gestures. As early as September,
1970, they reported 'local' trade agreements by provincial
officials with the Chinese. This and later such agree-
ments were certainly sanctioned by the central government.
The central governments themselves gradually negotiated
trarie agreements beginning in November, 1970. Soviet
commercial assistance to the PRC reached- a quarter of the
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1960 (the year the Soviets hac! severed all trade agreements
with China 1) volume by 1970, and that figure was doubled in
1981.
Perhaps the most public gesture of dampened hostilities
is in the field of propaganda. Given the steady strean of
polemics directed aaainst the PRC, any cessation of over a
few months duration gives an immediate signal to the Chinese
that the Soviets are particularly interested in rood rela-
tions. This has happened six times sine the 196° hor^v"
clash: in late 1969, 1971, 1976, 1979, 1991, an^ 1°°2.
Since the Chinese have not reciprocated in like fashion,
this is tantamount to a unilateral Soviet concession.
3. SOVIET SIGNALS OF INTIM IDATIO'VT
The previous headinn contains ample indicators o f Soviet
employment of the 'carrot' side of diplomacy. This section
considers those actions distinctly not intended for good-
will. 'Gesture' can also imply 'pretext' . The accommodat-
ing moves discussed above may also be self-serving to the
Soviets
.
The inception of the dispute has not tempered Soviet
policies to appease the Chinese. The principal motive of
these policies may not have been directed at the PRC, but
they have an anti-Chinese content. One of the first
examples of this is the' issue of nuclear non-proliferation.
As 'early as 1958, the Chinese made it clear to the Soviets
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that they would not support Moscow en the nuclear test ban
treaty then being negotiated with, the US and U.K. Moscow's
later support for expanding the test ban (signed in 1963) to
non-proliferation incensed the Chinese, w'Ho considered such
an action to be directed at them and a violation of their
sovereignty. The Soviets persisted, and sinne^ the treaty
in 1968.
Another area of a long standing anti-Chinese policy is
minority nationalities. T^ e Chinese territory in the c ln^-
Soviet border regions is sparsely ponulated, but this ponu-
lation is largely non-Han. The Czars and Soviets both
played upon the Chinese programs of Sinification to foment
discontent in the border regions. In 1°70, the Soviets went
so far as to openly promote a 'Free Turkestan' movement por
the liberation of Xinjiang province from the PRC . 3 'The
Chinese claim the Soviets subverted the 2no,OQO Uigurs who
fled to the USSR and are even now using them to incite the
Moslem peoples of China.
The Soviets have also made a concerted effort to isolate
the Chinese in the international system, in both the social-
ist and non-socialist arenas. The character o^ Soviet
.alliances within the socialist camp since the dispute illus-
trates this. The Soviet-Mongolian People's Republic (MPR)
in 1966, Soviet-Czechoslovakian (1970), and Soviet-
Vietnamese (1978) tjreaties all have an anti-Chinese
character. ^ This is rlislayed by two common traits:
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1 1 they give juridical force to the principle of Soviet
intervention; and 2) they are alliances against Chinese
aggression. As a socialist country in its own eyes--and in
Soviet-- the PRC obviously does not countenance Soviet
intervention in either the treaties or as elaborated in the
Brezhnev Doctrine (196ft). ^he anti-Chinese rrilitary content
of the treaties derives from their unlimited c^a - 3 : - e r .
This is not quite as vague as it sounds. D rior to 1-66, r '
Soviet treaties were specifically directed at C e r
-
n ? nv




all countries, including socialist, has ominous implications
for the PRC. This is especially true in the MPR's case.
Since the MPP borders no countries other than the rjsstf ?- -
PRC, its treaty with the USSR is almost blatantly anti-
Chinese .
The Soviets have made recurrent attempts to construct a
general anti-Chinese agreement as well. Soviet proposals
for an Asian Collective Security System from the first were
regarded as anti-Chinese by all the member states concerned,
and hence rejected. The Soviets have made it more envious
since 1976, when the Soviet proposals suogested the exclu-
sion of the PRC. In spite of the lack of success o? the
proposals, they are no less effective in portraying Soviet
discontent with the PRC.
The Soviet military has been an effective instrument in
Soviet policy regarding China. The steady build-up of the
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army alone the border--both in numbers and quality—worries
the Chinese. The Soviet military always had a relative
advantage over the Chinese along the border. The PRC cannot
escape the threat implied by Moscow as it has upgraded its
forces. This includes the latest' addition of two Class I
airborne divisions in 1981 as well as the massive infusion
after the 1969 border clashes. The Soviet navy has added
another dimension to the military threat since 197°.
February of that year becran the continuous deployment seen
since in the South China Sea and other waters of F the rr?T
.
The PRC cannot effectively counter either of these threats.
Then there are those items mentioned as accommodations
that are possible of additional interpretations. Moscow's
image as the initiator in the negotiation process has also
given an image as the reasonable anr! peace-loving partici-
pant. This has been useful in qarnering support for the
Soviet view among other members of the worl^ socialist move-
ment. Nor has -it meant that the Soviets necessarily have
given up any advantage whatsoever in the negotiation
process. The concessions the Soviets have made, although
genuine, have all been minor and on specific issues. There
has been no relenting over the principal obstacle, an
agenda. "Russian strategy has been to start with an 'acree-
ment on general principles,' allowing 'intractable' specific
issues to be taken up subsequently—whether they be resolved
or remain unsettled. "5 The Soviets have been successful
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at this. They have succeeded in achieving an exchar.ce 2 c
ambassadors (1966) and in getting the character of the talks
shifted from the border itself to normalization. T^ e minor
changes they have espoused on individual issues have been
minor indeed. For instance, the latest Soviet proposal on
troop reductions was not only unofficial, but actually a
statement that such reductions ^ i gh
t
be possible to nego-
tiate. They did not agree to negotiate reductions. In
fact, no reductions were neootiate^. ^dd it i ?nal ! y, -" ^
proposals themselves may only seen innocuous. a s point "1
out elsewhere, a Chinese concession on a nonaggression
treaty could have disastrous effects on internal Chinese
politics. The status of the Soviet negotiator has also
changed. Kuznetsov was replaced by Leonid F. Ilyichev in
late 1970, a lower ranking Deputy Foreign minister in the
Far East Department of the Foreign Ministry. In the sphere
of propaganda, it must he remembered that polemics ha^/e
always begun again. Finally, fostering Chinese dependence
on Soviet trade would provide the Soviets with a useful
lever over China.
Other examples of the tough side of Soviet diplomacy are
the out-of-hand rejection of a Chinese proposal for a non-
aggression treaty in 1974 (it contained objectionable
clauses such as 'mutual force reductions' . . . h Soviet
attempts to subvert the Chinese code word 'heqemonism' in
the 1979 negotiations, and the political pressure the
36
Soviets placed on Japan not to sicn the 1978 Sino-Japanese
Treaty
.
Such an unrelenting posture in Soviet diplomacy accords
well with the Soviet ideological position as mentioned ear-
lier. It is the Chinese who must make the major concessions
before their relations can be normalized.
C. THE VIEW WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
When considering the view of individual Soviet: leaders
on Soviet policy toward China great liberties ha^e to be
taken with the information available. It is so scant b-~-
only the most general conclusions can be reached, an^ those
only by inference.
Perhaps the single most important piece of evidence is
the almost complete unanimity, and constancy, of the leader-
ship's public statements since 1969. There is no waffling
on the nature of the dispute. The Chinese were at pault,
are at fault and will be at fault (unless they recant) .
Polemical and ideological castigations today are virtually
identical with those of a decade ago, barrina chances in
tone that vary with the tenor of international events. Oleg
B. Rakhmanin, a very influential Soviet Sinoloaist,
published a 1982 article that could have lifted its criti-
cism of China right out of his official (Soviet^ history of
Sino-Soviet relations published in 1971. ' As pointed out
above, neither has the Soviet position on the negotiations
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changed. The gist of all this was stated by Rakhm.anin in
his article, "It is up to China to take initiatives to
improve relations; the Soviet Union has done all it can.""
The significance of this consistency of views may not he
apparent unless one considers the tremendous amount of mate-
rial on China published in the USSR. It all could not be so
constant, over so long a time, except as a reflection of
genuine unanimity in the too leadership. There are no ten-
tative proposals for a change in policy (as is sep" i ~ ^~ : •-•>
areas of foreign policy or military affairs ' , or an/ ^ v~ ; -
tiaues of past Soviet policy. Khrushchev's words are as
valid today as they were when he said of Soviet Chinese
policy, "...I gather our aovernment's position hasn't
changed. In fact, I think toriay the Soviet Union is pur-
suing the same policies which were conducted when I was hea^
of the government and the party".- In fact, the only
exception this writer has noted is Suslov's 1979 suggestion
that the PRC is no longer a socialist country.^ He was
later overruled by Brezhnev.-'--'- Little else could be as
indicative of the hard line toward China that seems to be
held by all the top Soviet leaders.
Given that there are few, if any, disparities -o-f view
among Soviet leaders on their Chinese policy, what can be
determined by the effect of their position on their careers?
The evidence is again sketchy. In this regard, Donald
Zagoria makes an interesting statement, "...every new Soviet
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leader since Stalin's death has attached a high priority to
trying to improve relations with China. "12 j^ is a
sweeping statement that is not supported by much evidence.
It is generally conceded that Khrushchev's Beijina visit in
October, 1954, demonstrated his priority over Malenkov.
Yet, this only demonstrates the utility of an important ally
for symbolic importance. Despite his later assertions that
the seeds of the dispute lay with Stalin's policies,
Khrushchev did not significantly alter those policies. The
dispute with China exacerbated under Khrushchev exactly
because he subordinated relations with the PRC to other
Soviet goals. On Brezhnev's succession in October, 1^64",
Mao apparently had hopes of an improvement in relations.
The hope was almost immediately dashed by Chou Fn-Lai's
futile Moscow visit the succeeding month, and confirmed by
breaking off of the boundary negotiations Khrushchev ini-
tiated. As for Andropov, his tenure marked the beginnina of
a new round of polemics after one of the seemingly most
promising lulls since the dispute began. Where are the
Soviet efforts to improve relations Zagoria implies? If
anything, each succession has displayed the Soviet trend of
a hard-line status guo regarding Soviet Chinese policy.
Another recognizable figure in the Soviet leadership is
their chief delegate in the talks, Leonid Ilyichev. His
thirteen-year tenure is typical of the stability .of Soviet
leadership, but also testifies to his successful performance
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in protecting Soviet interests. What has more bearing is
his prior career. In I960, he was the head of the Sciet
Central Committee agitation and propaganda sector for non-
Russian Republics. He was an instrumental figure in devis-
ing the massive ideological campaign launched in 1 Q 60 to
justify Khrushchev's policies and prevent domestic dete-
rioration. ^ tie was recocnized as Khrushchev's chie p
ideologist at the time of the succession, and thereupon
^emoted to Deputy "ore inn Minister. T^e point is two^ " ° .
The USSR starred the post with a party ideologist, w^ic^ i -
a testament to the importance of ideology in the dispute.
And Ilyichev had helped formulate Khrushchev ' s policies but
was nonetheless trusted with a rather sensitive post. TJ is
ideology could not have been suspect, and was appropriate
for the mission. Finally, he was recently promoted within
the ranks of the Deputy Foreign Ministers.
The thrust of the evidence all lies in one direction.
Soviet leadership since the inception of the dispute has
been in agreement about the policies to pursue with the PRC,
and has consistently applied those policies. They have
implemented a tough, hard line with China's leaders and only
deviate from it for minor tactical gains.
D. THE SOVIET VIFW OF PRC POLITICAL TRENDS
In formulating their China strategy, Soviet leaders must
consider the Chinese- side of the eguation . They must
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structure their position in accordance with their evaluation
of the political situation in China so that they may achieve
the best results. This poses Soviet leadership much the
same problems Western observers have. Soviet leaders from
Brezhnev on down have mentioned the difficulty in getting
accurate information about events in China. They pay meat
attention to events in China, but the element of uncertainty
inhibits their conclusions.
The Soviets see domestic policy as the determinant )f
PRC foreign policy. The links are substantial an-1 ne*- •=»-
sive. Curing the initial stages of the dispute, the Soviets
believed that Mao and Maoism were the obstacles to normal
relations. It was Mao's egotism and xenophobia that led him
to eschew the Soviet political model, and hence Soviet mili-
tary and economic aid. Of course, this resulted in the
trampling of pro-Soviet elements within the Party and mili-
tary. There is some truth to this. There was a relatively
open debate within the Chinese leadership 1957-1959 that
resulted in rejecting Soviet assistance in building up the
military on the grounds that it would create an unwanted
dependence on the USSR. This was soon extended to the econ-
omic sphere as well -(I960). Regardless, the Soviets firmly
believe the attacks on the USSR and Soviet policies were
calculated to, "...bring major dividends to China's interna-
tional politics [while not] bringing much, harm to the PRC in
the domestic front. "-^ Thus the Soviets were confounded
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when the death of Mao did not bring about a reversal of
Chinese policy under Hua . The advent of Deng see'-? : more
reasonable to then1 , but again a distinct break with Maoism
has not resulted in a more pro-Soviet policy, only a modera-
tion of tension. The Soviets are nothing if not tenacious,
and rather than reverse ther interpretation of the dispute
place their hopes in what they see as contradictory po] i-i^>^
in Ch i n a .
The Soviets c irmlv believe that 'lao's personal st;at ir^f
an'1 prestige were required to allow the CC° 1 eaders"1-" L^ t'~
impose his policies on China. Any Maoist policies without
Mao create a 'crisis of confidence' among the Chinese
people.-'- In addition, the new Chinese leaders a^m.i t
the deplorable state of China's economy. This is tantamount
to official recognition of the negative result's of Maoism
associated with socialism. So, "...propaganda attacks on
the USSR now can be construed with attack on the rightful-
ness Of socialism. "-'-" Chinese leaders can continue this
policy only at their peril. (Incidentally, this 'explains'
the recent moderation of anti-Soviet polemics. 11
Another Chinese internal 'contradiction' results from
the importance now given to improving the Chinese economy.
The prime goal is now to restore the economy. To succeed
will require outside help. The PRC now turns to the West
for such assistance, but this will only add to instability.
This is because 1) the PRC is not ready for the
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technological and economic dependence on the West which will
result; and 2) there is a strong political faction opposed
to the present ideological bias towards the West.^ 7 The
stability of the leadership will fall apart if this
continues
.
The Soviets believe that there will be an inevitable
growth of pro-Soviet factions that will overturn the anti-
Soviet bias in Chinese policy. The alterna ti ve—China '
s
rejection of socialism— is impossible, in the Soviet vie'-',
because of China's historical political tradition ^n'"1
cul ture . "^
In the meantime, the Soviets admit that the anti-Soviet
bias will continue until the contradictions are resolved.
In spite of Deng's break with overt Maoism, Oleg Rakhmanin,
f irst deputy head of the Central Committee's Department for
Relations with Socialist and Workers' Parties, states:
The ideological orientation now underway in China is
simply designed to make Maoism more flexible, while
retaining its essence of Sinified Marxism plus a hegem-
onistic foreign policy and ariti-Sovietism . The changes
in China's domestic oolicy are not sianificant and they
are aimed at providing a more dependable basis for
Beijing's anti-Sovietism. *-9
The uncertainty principle, and past differences between
Soviet expectations drawn from their ideology and reality,
lead the Soviets to hedge their bets. Usually found under
headings of remaining Maoist tendencies, or 'Western anti-
Soviet imperialism, are factors which mitigate the Chinese
impulse to return to the Soviet sphere. The PRC has been a
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socialist country for thirty years, true, but roce tr.an two-
thirds of that time has created a tradition o c a.nti-
Sovietism. Pro-Soviet factions have been decimated by
frequent purges, especially during the cultural revolution.
The resurgence of an anti-Western faction does not neces-
sarily equate to a pro-Soviet faction. Most important of
all is the dawnina realization that an independent Thinese
foreign policy is not necessarily a hold-over from ''acis - .
The Chinese seem to believe it is in their national inte v"
to keep their freedom of maneuver 1 These all indicate that
it might be a long time before the contradictions
materialize ....
Chinese foreign policy has given the Soviets some con-
cern, and as far as they are concerned, exacerba te^1 the
nature of the dispute. The trend in Chinese foreign policy
has been for better relations with the West. Continued
Chinese association with the West is an anathema to the
Soviets
.
The first shock to the Soviets was the PRC ' s reconcilia-
tion with the US. The Soviet press picked up on the impend-
ing US/PRC detente early in 1971, well before Kissinger's
secret visit to China. Ever since the improvement in
American and Chinese relations has been a thorn in the side
of the Soviets. The improvement in relations is variously
characterized as a US ploy to threaten the Soviets via a
dangerous ' puppet ' (the '1941 complex') or a Chinese move to
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threaten the USSR with a two- front war. In either case, the
Soviets perceive an American and Chinese alliance as a very
serious threat to their security. After Dixon's 1972
Beijing visit, there was a perceptible hardening in Soviet
propaganda that was continued further after US and D RC rela-
tions were normalized in 1979. Other than Soviet hope in
the long-term contradiction between a communis t /capital is
t
alliance, the Soviets place their faith in the belief that
US aid to the PRC in the amounts necessary is not cre-
dible. 2^ The other sinole most disturbing event tc fc^e
Soviets is the successful negotiation of the Sino-Japanese
Treaty in 1978, in the face of stiff Soviet pressure to the
contrary. The Soviets found it incredible that the Chinese
placed their antipathy to the Japanese aside in favor of
increased commercial contacts. But the Soviets were well
aware of the benefits the dynamic and advanced Japanese
economy could confer to the Chinese, as the Soviets have
long wooed the Japanese for much the same reasons . Thus the
treaty was a double affront to the Soviets: it provides the
potential to develop the Chinese into an even more worrisome
threat, and it was a public coup by the PRC over the
Soviets
.
What the Soviets fear most, however, is a melding of the
above two sets of circumstances. An American, Japanese and
Chinese alliance would pose a disastrous threat to the USSR.
Combined with the existence of Western Europe to their west,
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the Soviets */ould be surrounded by the world's most powerful
states. As William Hyland says, " v 'o Soviet leader in his
right nind would passively watch the growth of Chinese power
sponsored by the United States, Japan and Western
Europe. "21 Such an alliance is beyond doubt what the
Soviets fear most, and is what they direct much of their
foreign policy to prevent.
Quite simply, the Soviets: do not trust the Chinese,
b e 1 i e v e th e v manifest a str^ n n a n t i - S ov i e t bias, a n '" f c res - ">
no chance in this relationship for some time. dialer
confirms this, "Indeed, there exists a genuine belief among
the Soviet leaders and the population as a whole that the
Chinese are committed to a long-term, acrgressive,
anti-Soviet policy. "22
E. EVALUATIOM OF SOVIET POLICY ALTERNATIVES TOWARD CHI? TA
The Soviets have four options they may pursue in their
relations with China: rapprochement, detente, the status
quo, and war. They will he considered in this order.
Rapprochement, or friendly relations, would provide
benefits to the Soviets other than avoiding the risk of war.
Under the conditions Moscow has already set for such a cir-
cumstance, it would gain a new 'client' state subservient to
its wishes. This would solidify the world communist riove-
ment and be a strong lever against the US. As the Soviets
face a declining economy and labor pool, a .decrease in
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tension that could allow demobilizing their eastern border
would be very welcorre. But rapprochement would also brine
problems. The PRC is too strong a state to be completely
subservient. To prevent another, possibly permanent, rift
the Soviets would have to make concessions to their junior
partner. This would inevitably generate friction that could
de-stabilize the Soviet leadership. Worse, the Soviet econ-
omy is already struggling, and the strains of supporting an.
undeveloped country the size of China could he very serious.
Finally, the Soviets would have to work strenuously to over-
come their deep-seated suspicions of the Chinese before
rapprochement could work. It is doubtful whether they would
even try to do this, much less be capable of it.
The relaxing of tensions cbaracterized by 'detente'
would be a much easier proposition to conclude. Acrain, the
risk of war is lessened, and some border de-mobilization
might be possible. It would not require complete capitula-
tion by the Chinese, and hence would be much more flexible.
Nor need detente incur economic support beyond reasonable
bounds. The possibilities of a 'China card' to use aaainst
the US would be weaker, but still there. It would entail
minimal cultural interaction and not provoke Russian xeno-
phobia. This is an excellent set of benefits. The major
offset is that the PRC would retain too much autonomy. The
Soviets would be forced to tacitly accept policies that they
might strenuously object to, such as continued Western
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economic aid to a country not certainly their ally. ^is
would acain be a difficult conflict to accept by the Soviet
leadership
.
The status quo as it is now might be very acceptable tc
the Soviets. The risk of war is relatively low, and they
would have to make no compromises to maintain it. ^^
latter is a very strona point. The USSR is l.ackinc /ery
little in the way of natural resources, and would not rain
very much else with increase;"1 trade */ith China ^ i .'er ,, ' :
current levels. The PRC is still an undevelonp^ :onn '- •- •
that faces enormous difficulties before it can modernize gr"!
rival Soviet power. It may well be that China's problems
are insurmountable. After the first shock of American an-"1
Japanese normalization with the PRC, the Soviets perceive
relatively little improvement since. Their fears of a PRC/
US /Japanese alliance may never materialize. Since "loina
nothing will maintain the status quo, it certainly has the
best chance of continuing.
The final solution to the Chinese problem is also
fraught with the most dangers. The only way to test the
full strength of China's military is to test it. Such a
test could literally mean failure, especially if the US
entered on a two-front war. The cost to the Soviets vvould
be phenomenal, and given the existinq internal strains (the
economy, minor.ity nationalism, weak loyalties in Eastern
Europe), the USSR would risk internal destruction. Any
9R
theory that the Soviet Union is preparing for an attack on
the PRC to provide itself with the security of a buffer
zone, as advocated by Edward Luttwak and considered by
William Kennedy, is not tenable. 23
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VI . cc^:clltsiqm
The history of Sino-Soviet relations has rore often than
not been marked with strife and tension. Czarist Russia
expanded in Asia mostly at China's expense. ^here was only
a brief hiatus in conflict after the Soviets -vTeste" power
from the Czars. Once China consolidate"'1 itself under t 1 ^ -?
Communists, a brief period o^ friendly relations ensue- 1 .
But ir reconcil iable differences in ideology and national
interest soon forced these two states back into conflict.
This reached the extent of armed border clashes in l n G^.
Over the next decade and a half tensions gradually reduce' 1
as both sides perceived the dangers of war too great to
risk. But the fundamental ideological and national interest
differences remain.
The Soviets believe their foreign and domestic policy is
a proper blend of communist ideology (as they have inter-
preted it) and their national interest. Indeed, they do not
even recognize a difference, and consider them identical
concepts. The contradictions that occur are only surface
contradictions of a tactical nature. The strategical prin-
ciples that underlie the ideological foundations of their
policies cannot be tampered with without reoressino on the
socialist path. The self-evident success of the Soviet
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model confirms its propriety for the entire worlc1 cormunist
movement
.
Regretfully, the PRC has chosen to deviate fror this
model. The result was predictable. From the moment the
Chinese began to accept incorrect interpretations of
Marxism-Leninism, their development was arreste^, and even
regressed. Their economy is a shambles, the military was
weakened, and internal political instability resulted. T^is
is unfortunate, but the serious problem is that the mis-
guided Chinese Communists have also impeded the progress o^
the Soviet Union. By giving way to Maoism and emotional
xenophobia they have falsely presented the USSR as a threat
to their sovereignty and communism in general. Though
undeveloped, the PRC is too large, populous and potentially
powerful to ignore when it consciously works contrarv to
Soviet policy, and even threatens military action.
Therefore, the Soviet Union has reacted firmly aoainst
the PRC. Its military forces along the border have been
strengthened to forestall any rash moves by the Chinese.
Meanwhile, it has constructed its foreign policy to contain
and isolate the Chinese until they realize, in the long
term, the folly of their ways.
Sino-Soviet relations will most likely continue as' they
are. The Soviets would welcome an improvement in relations,
but it must be on their terms. They cannot violate the
ideological principles of their stance without removing the
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justification for their Leadership. Since the Chinese are
in much the same cos it ion, an ^ this p act was the primary
contributor to beginning the dispute, rapprochement is
unlikely. The possibility of detente suffers from this to a
lesser degree, but suffer it does. This explai/is why
although the Soviets woul. 1 like improved relations, t^ey
have done very little to achieve them. Soviet policy is j s
firmly anti-Chinese as they believe the PRC ' s is =inti-
Soviet
.
Since the Soviets will not compromise to amel ioraf-^ f-.h^
very real threat they perceive posed by the PRC, and vorse
its potential when developed by Western aid, t^ev have
consistently acted to intimidate China by strength. This
policy is only offset by tactical concessions necessary to
maintain the relaxed tensions acceptable by both parties,
and no more. In the long run, no more is needed, since the
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